"the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated by the critic to himself."
Therefore, "one must listen to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualified himself by contradictions
or known factual inaccuracies."
Josh's footnote for this is 34. Montgomery, John Warwick. History and Christianity. Downers Grove, Ill. 60515:
Inter-Varsity Press, 1971. Used by permission.
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First, Josh did not specifically assert that Aristotle said the exact words
"the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated by the critic to himself."
Instead, Josh credits Montgomery in a way that makes it appear that Montgomery is citing that dictum in Montgomery's own personally chosen wording.
Which means Josh isn't giving us exactly what Aristotle said. Well, why not?
Prior efforts by skeptics failed to turn up an original source for this Aristotle-reference:
http://lists.topica.com/lists/ii_erranc ... 88&start=1
The only thing I could find that might be something of a vague match is Aristotle's remarks in Poetics about how critic's objections to poetry ought to be handled:
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.3.3.html
However, the only section of Aristotle at that link that would be relevant to the issue of handling critic's objections that something asserted was factually false, are Aristotle's following remarks:
Here are my problems with Josh and the apologists who blindly repeat this "dictum":Part I
I propose to treat of Poetry in itself and of its various kinds, noting the essential quality of each, to inquire into the structure of the plot as requisite to a good poem; into the number and nature of the parts of which a poem is composed; and similarly into whatever else falls within the same inquiry. Following, then, the order of nature, let us begin with the principles which come first. Epic poetry and Tragedy, Comedy also and Dithyrambic poetry, and the music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation. They differ, however, from one another in three respects- the medium, the objects, the manner or mode of imitation, being in each case distinct.
Section 3, Part Part XXV
...With respect to critical difficulties and their solutions, the number and nature of the sources from which they may be drawn may be thus exhibited.
...Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply, 'But the objects are as they ought to be'; just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides, as they are. In this way the objection may be met. If, however, the representation be of neither kind, the poet may answer, 'This is how men say the thing is.' applies to tales about the gods. It may well be that these stories are not higher than fact nor yet true to fact: they are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of them. But anyhow, 'this is what is said.' Again, a description may be no better than the fact: 'Still, it was the fact'; as in the passage about the arms: 'Upright upon their butt-ends stood the spears.' This was the custom then, as it now is among the Illyrians.
1 - The "poetry" Aristotle's analysis refers to, appears to be actual poetry and isn't just a word generally encompassing all manner of historical writing. If that be the case, then his remarks on how to deal with possibly factually false assertion in poetry, would not apply to most of the NT, which the fundie apologists insist is simply straightforward historical narrative/theology.
2 - There is nothing in the applicable context of Aristotle's Poetics to indicate that he wanted the reader to hold to the presuppositions enunciated by Montgomery's interpretive remarks, namely, to presume the document to be free of error. Aristotle's remarks appear instead to be criteria by which to decide whether a legitimate error exists, they are not a mandate that the reader must presume the document's innocence.
3 - It really doesn't matter if Josh/Montgomery interpreted Aristotle correctly: historiography has advanced much since the 4 century b.c., and nothing is more certain than the fact that historians of ancient times more often sought to edify, than simply to "tell it like it is", to say nothing of the fact that because writing histories was such a difficult monumental task, those who engaged in such projects were usually commissioned, which raises the question of whether they would be objective when dealing with apparent historical facts in disagreement with the views of their underwriters (such as "experts" hired by attornies who just happen to assert things in a way that allows no other view except the view of the attorney who paid the expert).
Comments?