Rules of Historical Reasoning

Discussion about the New Testament, apocrypha, gnostics, church fathers, Christian origins, historical Jesus or otherwise, etc.
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neilgodfrey
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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Ben C. Smith wrote: Sat Sep 23, 2017 7:19 am
My question was regarding Carrier's treatment of the source he finds behind the Pauline trial narratives in Acts. You refer me to chapter 10, which is all about the gospels. Where does Carrier discuss the genre of the source he claims to have found behind the trial narrative?
Or maybe I meant to type Chapter 9. It's right next to the chapter on the Gospels.
Maybe, but I do not find a discussion of the genre of this alleged source in chapter 9, either. Honestly, I think Carrier simply failed to address that question.
He does not have a section headed "genre" but he discusses at length the literary character of Acts -- or its genre. His opening sentence in the chapter addresses the genre of Acts:
The book of Acts has been all but discredited as a work of apologetic historical fiction. (p. 359)
And he continues to explain, to cover the details that lead to that conclusion. Example....
Every other story in Acts is like this: a fictional creation, woven from
prior materials unrelated to any actual Christian history, to sell a particular
point Luke wanted to make. . . . .

Clearly the author of Acts was not writing actual history but revisionist
history. Which we call pseudohistory. He simply made things up, with
little real care for historical accuracy or fact.
Ben C. Smith wrote: Sat Sep 23, 2017 7:19 am
And yet historians of ancient India have held entire conferences dedicated to pinning down the date of his birth and/or death. Pointless conferences, I suppose you, for one, would have to say.
I'd like you to be specific with names and papers/books.
There was a symposium in Germany in 1988, for example:

The reality is that there is not a unanimously accepted date for the historical Buddha’s life amongst scholars. In 1988 CE a symposium named “The Dating of the Historical Buddha” took place in Gottingen, Germany. The dates proposed by a group of experts who attended goes from 486 BCE to 261 BCE for the decease of the Buddha.

This symposium is mentioned in articles on the topic, including one freely available online by Awadh Kishore Narain. JSTOR has articles on the "historical Buddha" (such as this one: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25183119?s ... b_contents). Popular Controversies in World History (2012) includes an entire chapter on the subject. Heinz Bechert edited a 1995 book about it. (There seems to be a whole contingent of German scholars who are particularly interested in dating the Buddha's life and death.)
I have since acquired access to Bechert, H. (Ed.). (1995). When Did the Buddha Live?: The Controversy on the Dating of the Historical Buddha. Selected Papers Based on a Symposium Held under the Auspices of the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

On skimming through a few of papers I see I need to withdraw my earlier comment about conceding that Buddhist scholars fall into the same methodological pitfalls as biblical scholars addressing the historicity of Jesus. The nature of the sources, and even the questions themselves, and the manner of the research, appears on the surface to be valid -- given the assumptions. But I am saying this after fairly quick reads of a few of the papers, and they are all covering material that is entirely new to me. Further study may lead me to a different opinion. But on the face of it I cannot lump what is done in the conference on the dating of the Buddha in with the methods used by biblical scholars in their explorations of the historical Jesus.
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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Peter Kirby wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 12:34 am

Well, one difference is that Theissen's case is much more detailed and carefully thought out.

I suspect any relative grading has less to do with the source criticism itself than it has to do with the "background knowledge" accepted respectively by Theissen and by Carrier before said source criticism even really gets started. Each study takes place in a setting where the conclusion is already believed to be at least plausible in the first place. Perhaps there are some well-hidden assumptions made by both parties, which are concealed because they are so patently obvious to the researcher as to be invisible (or perhaps just because they're notoriously hard things to prove). In any case, the result is that one man's "plausible hypothesis, which is supported by various clues" is another one's balderdash.
Those "well hidden assumptions" really are critical. The valid approach to source criticism (as per Mark Day et al) is to test the provenance and nature of the source itself. If the source is a narrative, then narrative criticism necessarily enters the task of source criticism. If there are inconsistencies or pointers to specific external literature in the narrative then those details have the potential to be significant.

If the source is literature the criticism must necessarily be of the literature, and the literary names and places in the literary narrative.

It is quite another to approach a narrative on the unsupported assumption that it "really happened" at some level and the historian's task is to sift how much is flourish and what core is left.

There is a place for that last approach, but it is only after the work of source criticism is complete and the "well hidden assumption" that is the centre of the research is first verified by external support.
Last edited by neilgodfrey on Sun Sep 24, 2017 1:04 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Ben C. Smith
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 12:47 pm
Ben C. Smith wrote: Sat Sep 23, 2017 7:19 amMy question was regarding Carrier's treatment of the source he finds behind the Pauline trial narratives in Acts. You refer me to chapter 10, which is all about the gospels. Where does Carrier discuss the genre of the source he claims to have found behind the trial narrative?
He does not have a section headed "genre" but he discusses at length the literary character of Acts -- or its genre. His opening sentence in the chapter addresses the genre of Acts:
The book of Acts has been all but discredited as a work of apologetic historical fiction. (p. 359)
And he continues to explain, to cover the details that lead to that conclusion. Example....
Every other story in Acts is like this: a fictional creation, woven from
prior materials unrelated to any actual Christian history, to sell a particular
point Luke wanted to make. . . . .

Clearly the author of Acts was not writing actual history but revisionist
history. Which we call pseudohistory. He simply made things up, with
little real care for historical accuracy or fact.
Yes, I can see where he discusses the genre of Acts itself. But I am not asking about the genre of Acts. I am asking about the genre of the source behind Acts (specifically, behind the Pauline trial narratives) which Carrier claims to have uncovered.
On skimming through a few of papers I see I need to withdraw my earlier comment about conceding that Buddhist scholars fall into the same methodological pitfalls as biblical scholars addressing the historicity of Jesus. The nature of the sources, and even the questions themselves, and the manner of the research, appears on the surface to be valid -- given the assumptions. But I am saying this after fairly quick reads of a few of the papers, and they are all covering material that is entirely new to me. Further study may lead me to a different opinion. But on the face of it I cannot lump what is done in the conference on the dating of the Buddha in with the methods used by biblical scholars in their explorations of the historical Jesus.
Okay. Would you mind giving an example of the difference(s) you are seeing?
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 1:03 pm
neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 12:47 pm
Yes, I can see where he discusses the genre of Acts itself. But I am not asking about the genre of Acts. I am asking about the genre of the source behind Acts (specifically, behind the Pauline trial narratives) which Carrier claims to have uncovered.
The question of the genre of Acts is the only question we can ask. As far as I am aware we have no way of determining the genre of Carrier's postulated source behind a particular section of Acts, the speeches. How could we? That by no means undermines Carrier's hypothesis (we can argue against the hypothesis on other grounds, but not on the basis of the proposed source's genre.)
On skimming through a few of papers I see I need to withdraw my earlier comment about conceding that Buddhist scholars fall into the same methodological pitfalls as biblical scholars addressing the historicity of Jesus. The nature of the sources, and even the questions themselves, and the manner of the research, appears on the surface to be valid -- given the assumptions. But I am saying this after fairly quick reads of a few of the papers, and they are all covering material that is entirely new to me. Further study may lead me to a different opinion. But on the face of it I cannot lump what is done in the conference on the dating of the Buddha in with the methods used by biblical scholars in their explorations of the historical Jesus.
Okay. Would you mind giving an example of the difference(s) you are seeing?
The methods appear to be valid; one may question the underlying assumption that there was a Buddha in the first place, but the exercises of sifting through the data to see where they point chronologically or how they shape genealogically look to be text-based or source-based. They do not, as far as I have seen at this point, delve into reconstructing literary imaginary worlds assumed to have existed in real life. They seem to be strictly based on the source data itself.

As an aside, I see a library entry for a journal article that contains the first lines of the article:
...There seems little doubt that the Buddha, safe of the Sakya clan, actually existed. Although some people even deny this. However, it seems he did exist...
That's a library catalogue extract from "Estimating the dates of Buddha Sakyamuni's birth" by Biddulph Desmond, in Middle Way, 05/2011. (I don't have the full text.)

Then there is the following from Karen Armstrong's book, Buddha that I've snitched from a preview on amazon.com:
As a result of this dearth of reliable fact, some Western scholars in the nineteenth century doubted that Gotama had been a historical figure. They claimed that he had simply been a personification of the prevailing Samkhya philosophy or a symbol of a solar cult. Yet modern scholarship has retreated from this skeptical position, and argues that even though little in the Buddhist scriptures is what is popularly known as "gospel truth.” we can be reasonably confident that Siddhatta Gotama did indeed exist and that his disciples preserved the memory of his life and teachings as well as they could.
I find both passages interesting in their failure to appeal to any "real evidence". I recall picking up books on historical figures and reading in the preface or introduction the historian's note to readers explaining the "hard evidence" for the persons he was about to discuss.

Here we have a "retreat from a skeptical position" -- which I think should be considered a "retreat from scholarly research". What is left once we retreat from a skeptical position on anything? A hermeneutic of charity? Approaching the source as if it were a living human being that we must treat with good hospitality and kindness and avoid offending at all costs -- until he proves himself to be a liar? (These are the sorts of approaches some biblical scholars really do claim are valid.)

Scepticism appears to have acquired a negative connotation, as if it is necessarily akin to nihilism. All scepticism is, is agnosticism until the proof or supporting evidence appears and is tested.

The first quote is just as interesting. "There seems little doubt". That's the language of faith, or of "losing faith". This is followed by "it seems he did exist". It seems God exists, too, or that Fate rules our lives. Compare Armstrong's "we can be reasonably confident that [he] did exist".

In other words, once we rely upon certain kinds of traditions that first make their appearance long after the purported event or person, we are inevitably (and by definition, perhaps) on unstable ground.
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 1:38 pmThe methods appear to be valid; one may question the underlying assumption that there was a Buddha in the first place, but the exercises of sifting through the data to see where they point chronologically or how they shape genealogically look to be text-based or source-based.
I would have thought that assuming that Jesus existed would not be kosher in your judgment, and yet you write that the historical methods surrounding the Buddha appear to be valid despite "the underlying assumption that there was a Buddha in the first place." What is the difference? Or am I misreading you? Is it valid, then, to assume that Jesus existed and then go on from there to sift through the data to see where they point chronologically (as when they triangulate potential dates of birth and death using the chronological information in the gospels and chronographical texts)?
They do not, as far as I have seen at this point, delve into reconstructing literary imaginary worlds assumed to have existed in real life. They seem to be strictly based on the source data itself.
Is that not what assuming the existence of this figure actually is? If we read about a person named S. Gautama in texts either very late or bearing no greater pretensions to being histories than the gospels, and we assume that this person existed, how is that different than Theissen assuming that certain figures from the passion narrative, including Jesus himself, existed?

You keep using terminology such as "reconstructing literary imaginary worlds assumed to have existed in real life," and that terminology would seem to me to apply to assuming that the Buddha existed in real life, too. If that is not what you mean, then can you please rephrase it so that I can clearly see how assuming that Gautama exists differs from assuming that Jesus exists?
As an aside, I see a library entry for a journal article that contains the first lines of the article:
...There seems little doubt that the Buddha, safe of the Sakya clan, actually existed. Although some people even deny this. However, it seems he did exist...
That's a library catalogue extract from "Estimating the dates of Buddha Sakyamuni's birth" by Biddulph Desmond, in Middle Way, 05/2011. (I don't have the full text.)

Then there is the following from Karen Armstrong's book, Buddha that I've snitched from a preview on amazon.com:
As a result of this dearth of reliable fact, some Western scholars in the nineteenth century doubted that Gotama had been a historical figure. They claimed that he had simply been a personification of the prevailing Samkhya philosophy or a symbol of a solar cult. Yet modern scholarship has retreated from this skeptical position, and argues that even though little in the Buddhist scriptures is what is popularly known as "gospel truth.” we can be reasonably confident that Siddhatta Gotama did indeed exist and that his disciples preserved the memory of his life and teachings as well as they could.
I find both passages interesting in their failure to appeal to any "real evidence". I recall picking up books on historical figures and reading in the preface or introduction the historian's note to readers explaining the "hard evidence" for the persons he was about to discuss.

Here we have a "retreat from a skeptical position" -- which I think should be considered a "retreat from scholarly research". What is left once we retreat from a skeptical position on anything? A hermeneutic of charity? Approaching the source as if it were a living human being that we must treat with good hospitality and kindness and avoid offending at all costs -- until he proves himself to be a liar? (These are the sorts of approaches some biblical scholars really do claim are valid.)

Scepticism appears to have acquired a negative connotation, as if it is necessarily akin to nihilism. All scepticism is, is agnosticism until the proof or supporting evidence appears and is tested.

The first quote is just as interesting. "There seems little doubt". That's the language of faith, or of "losing faith". This is followed by "it seems he did exist". It seems God exists, too, or that Fate rules our lives. Compare Armstrong's "we can be reasonably confident that [he] did exist".

In other words, once we rely upon certain kinds of traditions that first make their appearance long after the purported event or person, we are inevitably (and by definition, perhaps) on unstable ground.
This all makes it sound as if you are back to considering that Buddha research has a lot of nonscholarship going on, just like Jesus research, especially since we have nothing but "traditions that first make their appearance long after the purported event or person" for the historical Buddha.

I am not trying to goad you or corner you here. I am honestly not. I am trying to clear up the haze of confusion which descends upon me when I read things that seem to be in tension with one another.
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 2:06 pm
neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 1:38 pmThe methods appear to be valid; one may question the underlying assumption that there was a Buddha in the first place, but the exercises of sifting through the data to see where they point chronologically or how they shape genealogically look to be text-based or source-based.
I would have thought that assuming that Jesus existed would not be kosher in your judgment, and yet you write that the historical methods surrounding the Buddha appear to be valid despite "the underlying assumption that there was a Buddha in the first place." What is the difference? Or am I misreading you? Is it valid, then, to assume that Jesus existed and then go on from there to sift through the data to see where they point chronologically (as when they triangulate potential dates of birth and death using the chronological information in the gospels and chronographical texts)?
I have been attempting to address valid historical reasoning. The starting point was the set of five rules set out by Mark Day. We can assume anything we want but what matters to the scholar is the method of reasoning or research used. (Of course I believe that certain assumptions are more valid than others, but I've been attempting to address the methods of historical research and the problem when unsupported assumptions throw a spanner in the works.)

I assume we don't know if Jesus existed. I can also begin with two other assumptions, one each either side of that position. But if Bayesian reasoning tells us anything -- and Mark Day goes on to discuss Bayesian reasoning in his book, and he even says at the point I love most that we can (and often do) do Bayesian reasoning without any of the mathematical formula -- then it is that persons beginning with polar opposite assumptions will, if they follow valid method and logic, come to the same ball-park conclusion at the end.

Besides, from the little I have seen of the conference papers addressing the date of the Buddha appear at first glance to be addressing the data itself and not getting into hypothetical historical reconstructions of persons within the data. That sounds fair enough to me. I can imagine some (perhaps only a few) scholars concluding that their dates for Buddha have some significance if not necessarily for a presumed historical Buddha.
Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 2:06 pm
They do not, as far as I have seen at this point, delve into reconstructing literary imaginary worlds assumed to have existed in real life. They seem to be strictly based on the source data itself.
Is that not what assuming the existence of this figure actually is? If we read about a person named S. Gautama in texts either very late or bearing no greater pretensions to being histories than the gospels, and we assume that this person existed, how is that different than Theissen assuming that certain figures from the passion narrative, including Jesus himself, existed?
The point is not merely in the assuming such and such existed per se, but in the use to which we put that assumption. It is one thing to read a story and say, "Hey, I like that story. I wish it were true, or, I am sure it is true or based on a real person!" It is another step to treat that assumption as a fact and proceed to reconstruct a source for the story based on that unsupported or invalidly supported assumption of historicity, or to reconstruct historical events based on that assumption.

That is very different from doing a mere text-literary source analysis or criticism that looks at the features of the source narrative itself.

To take an extreme example to try to make the difference clear: Jokes and spoofs. We have lots of jokes and spoofs about classic fairy tales, Red Riding Hood and Cinderella etc. If we have no knowledge of the source fairy tales of these jokes and spoofs, then we will nonetheless often see clues in the texts we do have that they are based on some other story. We may or may not be able to reconstruct the source stories from those clues.

But it would be overstepping the bounds to assume that such jokes and spoofs are based on "true stories".

Jokes and spoofs are an extreme example of a principle that applies across all source criticism.
Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 2:06 pmYou keep using terminology such as "reconstructing literary imaginary worlds assumed to have existed in real life," and that terminology would seem to me to apply to assuming that the Buddha existed in real life, too. If that is not what you mean, then can you please rephrase it so that I can clearly see how assuming that Gautama exists differs from assuming that Jesus exists?
I hope by now from the above we can put that bit of misunderstanding behind us. It is not the assumptions per se that are wrong; it is our abuse of them.

I think this fault is especially attractive in biblical studies because we always love to "know what really happened". Ditto for the passion for "wanting to believe" and "finding evidence for" the legendary King Arthurs and Robin Hoods. Running with assumptions of historicity and recreating a make believe "historical world" merely on the basis of unsupported or invalidly supported stories is not listed among Mark Day's five rules. The rules should put a stop to that error.
Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 2:06 pmThis all makes it sound as if you are back to considering that Buddha research has a lot of nonscholarship going on, just like Jesus research, especially since we have nothing but "traditions that first make their appearance long after the purported event or person" for the historical Buddha.

I am not trying to goad you or corner you here. I am honestly not. I am trying to clear up the haze of confusion which descends upon me when I read things that seem to be in tension with one another.
Hopefully the above does clarify where I think the misunderstanding arises. (The scholarly papers in the Dating Buddha volume are not trying to "reconstruct a historical Buddha", by the way.)

We all have to begin with assumptions of some kind; even if our assumption is that "we don't know", that is still an assumption. We may use loose language and say that such a position is beginning with a clean slate or with "no assumptions" -- but even that position is an assumption. (I don't know if I have been guilty of using that sort of loose language. I probably have at times. But at least exchanges here are helping me, I hope, to tighten up my expression.)

I think there have been many scientific theories or theories based on rational inquiry in the past that have over time and with further research, discoveries, refined methods, been found to have been based on misplaced assumptions. That doesn't mean that what was done in all those cases was not rational or sound method.

I have never, as far as I recall, flatly rejected the assumption that Jesus existed as a basis for an inquiry. It is a reasonable assumption with which to begin an inquiry. When I began my studies into the question of historicity of Jesus some years back I am pretty sure I did begin with that assumption and I recall being very unsettled at the mere thought or possibility that he might not be historical. One does one's best to defend one's long held beliefs. That's human, and not wrong. It's the methods and invalid rationalizations that end up often being quite circular (Historical Jesus is the best explanation for X; X is the proof or best explanation for the Historical Jesus) that are the problem.

(Dale Allison and Stevan Davies both even acknowledged this circularity in books they wrote.)

But valid reasoning and accepted sources, as said above, will bring inquirers starting out at opposite ends to roughly the same point in the end.
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Literary versus historical persons and events

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My illustration in the previous post is open to misunderstanding, I think. I wrote:
To take an extreme example to try to make the difference clear: Jokes and spoofs. We have lots of jokes and spoofs about classic fairy tales, Red Riding Hood and Cinderella etc. If we have no knowledge of the source fairy tales of these jokes and spoofs, then we will nonetheless often see clues in the texts we do have that they are based on some other story. We may or may not be able to reconstruct the source stories from those clues.

But it would be overstepping the bounds to assume that such jokes and spoofs are based on "true stories".

Jokes and spoofs are an extreme example of a principle that applies across all source criticism.
I do not mean by that example that we should assume all persons or events in any source must be fictional until proven otherwise.

Obviously if one were to come across an otherwise unknown diary of Hitler one would not assume that the author by name of Adolph was a fictional person.

What I am attempting to say is that a name and event in a literary source is by definition a literary name or event. That there was or was not ALSO a historical name or event prior to the text is another question. The point is that any literary source contains by definition literary characters, settings and events.

The Jerusalem temple in the gospels is a literary temple. We know there was also a real Jerusalem Temple, but we are not encountering that real Jerusalem Temple (in reality) when we read the gospels. We are reading the word "temple" and reading a literary narrative or account of events happening at that literary temple setting.

As it turns out, the literary temple does appear to be more like the size of a common pagan temple (relatively small) and not like the historical Jerusalem temple that was extremely large in area. (The literary Jesus is able to stop ("literally") all literary concourse through the literary temple.) (But we have the same distinction between the literary Jerusalem and the real Jerusalem, too, even if in details there is no contradiction between them.)

It is at the literary level -- that is, at the level of the source itself -- that the historian undertakes source criticism. It is the literary events and persons and places that make up such a historical source.

When the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper examined the Hitler diaries he was examining them as "sources". He came to different conclusions as he was exposed to more evidence and learned he had been initially lied to about their provenance. But he was also partly misled by a fallacy we encounter all too often among biblical scholars, ... "Why would anyone make them up?" He soon came to regret his naivety.

Source criticism needs to be distinguished from "diving in" to the "historical events and persons" indicated by the source and trying to solve a "who dunnit" mystery. That sort of exercise is fun entertainment, pretending all the characters are real, etc. But it is not (valid) scholarship.

There is a time to do the "who dunnit" thing, but that comes after source criticism.

The who dunnit or what happened exercise needs to reference information that stands independently from any one source and that can be used to contribute towards verification of something in a literary source.
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Re: Literary versus historical persons and events

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neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 5:07 pmThe Jerusalem temple in the gospels is a literary temple.
Given that many works of history are also solid examples of literature (of which Thucydides' opus may be considered chief), is the Athens in History of the Peloponnesian War a literary Athens?
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Re: Rules of Historical Reasoning

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Paul the Uncertain wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 1:35 am Peter
Perhaps there are some well-hidden assumptions made by both parties, which are concealed because they are so patently obvious to the researcher as to be invisible
That is one thing about Carrier's embrace of Bayes: moving from warm and cuddly heuristics to formal methods may help to reveal hidden assumptions. There is no known method that completely prevents an aggressive player from hiding the ball. Formality can make it more difficult to get away with that, however.
Each study takes place in a setting where the conclusion is already believed to be at least plausible in the first place.
At least conceptually, the foundational step in uncertain reasoning is to formulate a set of plausible hypotheses. It is almost inevitable that when you have background information, you will need to trade off two incompatible traits: completeness (all seriously possible alternatives are taken into account as specific hypotheses) and neutrality (all alternatives which are taken into account are reasonably treated as equally likely before the evidence is applied to them).
In any case, the result is that one man's "plausible hypothesis, which is supported by various clues" is another one's balderdash.
Gasp. That smacks of the extreme-postmodernist thought crime of recognizing that history is educated opinion (as if there was anything wrong with that or surprising about it).
I've not read Carrier but Aviezer Tucker has had very useful contributions to the use of Bayesianism in history. I have an incomplete digital copy of Carrier's book, so I'll have to see how he interacts specifically with Tucker's work when I can. Any thoughts on Carrier's treatment of Tucker's work?
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Re: Literary versus historical persons and events

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Ben C. Smith wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 5:18 pm
neilgodfrey wrote: Sun Sep 24, 2017 5:07 pmThe Jerusalem temple in the gospels is a literary temple.
Given that many works of history are also solid examples of literature (of which Thucydides' opus may be considered chief), is the Athens in History of the Peloponnesian War a literary Athens?
Yes. This is especially evident given that Thucydides blends historical and creative/imaginative scenarios relating to Athens in the one work. His Pericles is a literary Pericles, and we see this most clearly when Thucydides creates a speech for him to deliver. But even without the fictional details any Athens in literature, as a text, is by definition a literary Athens.

That does not mean that his work is not also about a real Athens or a real Pericles, of course.

(Since posting I have added a small piece at the end.)
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