Rule #1 of Historical Reasoning

[neilgodfrey]

It seems to me that, by preserving the strict definition of what a 'primary source' is, we tend to undermine the idea that they're strictly necessary for good history.

There is no standard definition of what a primary source is. I am using the term as used by Mark Day and a number of other historians who have written about historical research methods.

Since the definition of 'primary source' doesn't include anything about being the minimum standard necessary to be usable as evidence, it's only logical that things other than primary sources (including some of those 'secondary sources' that we keep hearing about) could possibly be usable as evidence.

There is no question that secondary sources are also valuable and valid sources. They most certainly are. Day's rule does not exclude secondary sources but it prioritizes primary sources over secondary sources.

That's the general rule. But the primary rule is always that all sources require critical evaluation and testing. Primary sources may give us lying propaganda at a face-value reading. Sometimes secondary sources can give us more accurate information than might be provided by a primary source. Mark Day's "rules" are all meant to be applied judiciously.

This rule goes to the heart of the "minimalist-maximalist" controversy (so-called) in OT studies. Does the historian prioritize secondary sources over the primary ones and come up with one history of "biblical Israel"? Or does one do the reverse and come up with quite another historical reconstruction?

(This conversation is hard to follow. If someone believes they didn't make a point, please don't assume that I attributed it to them.)

Actually I wasn't expecting a discussion to follow. I only posted the addendum separately so it would not be lost on page 20 something in the parent topic.

But I'm glad there has been some feedback because it has forced me to think a little more clearly about the nature of a historian's source material.

[neilgodfrey]

The correspondence 'content' that Bickerman has deduced (or induced) is probably still 'secondary' - there is still likely to be a probability as to its veracity.

All sources need to be tested for authenticity. We need to check whether a stone slab with an inscription dug up on an archaeological site has been planted there by a fraudster. If it is authentic, we need to test the nature of the inscription -- is it telling a lie for some reason? (Lots of imperial inscriptions are at best misleading.)

There is nothing unusual about questions of probability and authenticity being applied to primary sources. I think that even with the "House of David" or Tel Dan stele some scholars still hold on to their suspicions.

And of course in the case of Bickerman's Antiochus-Samaritan correspondence it must be even more subject to scrutiny since we lack the primary "in situ" physical carrier of the content. But even if we had that material evidence we would still need to make judgements about its authenticity.

[neilgodfrey]

Regardless of any semantic debate about the definition of "primary source," I don't think many historians (or any?) would be dogmatic that they are "absolutely necessary," would they?

What historical studies (apart from biblical studies) do you know of that do not have primary sources (as defined by Mark Day) at their base?

You use what is usable as you see it. Chracterize it and prioritize it as you will, making your arguments and qualifying your conclusions, and others will ultimately judge your work. I guess I concur in your confusion about these posts.

It is that kind of laissez-faire approach that I am arguing against. I am sticking my neck out and suggesting that we cannot validly start historical reconstructions without primary sources as our foundation.

Biblical scholars seem to tacitly acknowledge this "truism"(?) when they labour to create hypothetical and untestable primary sources through criteriology and memory theory.

[Ben C. Smith]

What historical studies (apart from biblical studies) do you know of that do not have primary sources (as defined by Mark Day) at their base?

You use what is usable as you see it. Chracterize it and prioritize it as you will, making your arguments and qualifying your conclusions, and others will ultimately judge your work. I guess I concur in your confusion about these posts.

It is that kind of laissez-faire approach that I am arguing against. I am sticking my neck out and suggesting that we cannot validly start historical reconstructions without primary sources as our foundation.

I am not trying to be difficult here. I truly do not understand your point here in light of previous statements you have made. For example, to your initial question, as to which historical studies do not have primary sources at their base, I would respond (A) the life of the Buddha and (B) the personal life of Charlemagne, both of which we have discussed before. As for your final statement, your suggestion of an inability to even start historical reconstructions without primary sources leads me to wonder what you mean by the terms you are using.

I believe you have defined "primary source" in a way which excludes the Life of Charlemagne (which was written after Charlemagne's death, not during his lifetime, and of which I believe we do not even possess the autograph). So are you saying that we cannot even start to reconstruct Charlemagne's personal life? (His public life has primary sources to start from, IIUC.) If this is not what you are saying, then how do we perform such a reconstruction (however incomplete), in consonance with your statement above, without primary sources?

For the life of the Buddha my puzzlement grows even greater, since you have now stated both (A) that historians of India trying to pin down his birth and death dates and a few of the cultural influences he must have felt during his time period is a valid exercise and (B), above, that one cannot even start an historical reconstruction without primary sources. Yet we lack anything remotely of the kind for the life of the Buddha. So are you saying that what historians of India are doing is not an historical reconstruction, but something else altogether? Because I do not see how it can be, to your mind, a valid historical reconstruction if one cannot even begin such an endeavor without primary sources. I am honestly confused.

[neilgodfrey]

What historical studies (apart from biblical studies) do you know of that do not have primary sources (as defined by Mark Day) at their base?

You use what is usable as you see it. Chracterize it and prioritize it as you will, making your arguments and qualifying your conclusions, and others will ultimately judge your work. I guess I concur in your confusion about these posts.

It is that kind of laissez-faire approach that I am arguing against. I am sticking my neck out and suggesting that we cannot validly start historical reconstructions without primary sources as our foundation.

I am not trying to be difficult here. I truly do not understand your point here in light of previous statements you have made. For example, to your initial question, as to which historical studies do not have primary sources at their base, I would respond (A) the life of the Buddha and (B) the personal life of Charlemagne, both of which we have discussed before.

What historical studies are there of the life of Buddha and personal life of Charlemagne? I am talking about research by professional historians, not religious tracts or children's stories or Readers Digest type popular reading. Our previous discussion did not address historical works on the life of Buddha. The conference papers to which you referred addressed the various calculations by later generations of the chronology of Buddha. That would be comparable to a study of what various church scholars were saying about the date of the birth of Jesus and assessing the pros and cons of each.

[neilgodfrey]

So are you saying that we cannot even start to reconstruct Charlemagne's personal life? (His public life has primary sources to start from, IIUC.) If this is not what you are saying, then how do we perform such a reconstruction (however incomplete), in consonance with your statement above, without primary sources?

What I wrote was "we cannot validly start historical reconstructions without primary sources as our foundation".

Of course we can say what was said about Charlemagne, what his biographer said, etc. We can say what the stories were about him. His reputation, if you like, after his death, and how people remembered him.

But I would be surprised if any researcher has received funds to seriously reconstruct the personal life of Charlemagne as a research project.

[MrMacSon]

... I am sticking my neck out and suggesting that we cannot validly start historical reconstructions without primary sources as our foundation.
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I agree, though I would think not much of what we're doing on BC&H is starting historical reconstructions.

We're often trying to deconstruct or re-jig past or long-standing assertions.

All sources need to be tested for authenticity.
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I agree. And what other sources might verify or counter their veracity need to be considered for each, too.
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[neilgodfrey]

We have a reconstruction that is based something like any of the following:

How do we know such and such really happened? We have texts to tell us so.

How do we know the texts tell us what really happened? No one would have made them up. The authors were obviously sincere.

How do we know the stories are true? They mention Jerusalem and Pilate and much more that we know really existed.

How do we know the stories are true? They contain vivid detail (e.g. Mark says the grass was green!)

How do we know the stories are true? They were passed down by oral tradition, proven to be very reliable in main details. And we can use criteria and memory theory to come kind of fairly close to the original sayings and events.

Each of these assertions can be encountered, in one form or another in the secondary literature. But it is the underlying logic which requires attention rather than these (dubious) assertions themselves. That logic is circular. The assumption that the literary construct is an historical one made to confirm itself. (P. Davies, p. 36 of In Search of 'Ancient Israel')

Too often a social and historical context is put forward, and then the narrative sources are made to fit this context, and finally the fit is used to confirm the reality of the historical context—a complete circularity of argument. Van Seters, p. 2 of The Biblical Saga of King David)

If we bypass Rule #1 we fall back on circularity to establish our historical reconstruction.

I doubt post grad students about to take up serious historical research are not excused from reading texts on historical method (by Mark Day, Prevenier and Howell, etc) if they happen to be lucky enough to be planning to study the historical Jesus or Buddha -- or Charlemagne.

[MrMacSon]

The authors were obviously sincere.
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That should be sin seer/s - - ie. seers of sin . . . . . . . .

Seer, noun
1. a person who sees; observer.

2. a person who prophesies future events; prophet ...

3.a person endowed with profound moral and spiritual insight or knowledge; a wise person or sage who possesses intuitive powers.

4.a person who is reputed to have special powers of divination, as a crystal gazer or palmist.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/seer

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[Paul the Uncertain]

Peter

Since the definition of 'primary source' doesn't include anything about being the minimum standard necessary to be usable as evidence, it's only logical that things other than primary sources (including some of those 'secondary sources' that we keep hearing about) could possibly be usable as evidence.

That's the Laplacean or Bayesian view. Any obervation (and only an observation, which is also an issue in this thread) can be used as evidence, provided that the analyst estimates that it bears upon the uncertainty.

Paul E. painted the picture well, without referring to Bayes:

I don't think many historians (or any?) would be dogmatic that they are "absolutely necessary," would they? You use what is usable as you see it.

This perspective rebuts an older view, championed by Hume, that there are different kinds of relevant obervations, some of which can be used as evidence and others which supposedly cannot. Hume was especially concerned about oral testimony, which has many of the undesirable features associated with secondary evidence (easily invented, often including interpretation and traditional elements, etc.).

This is a problem for Carrier and others who would introduce Bayesian methods into historical practice. If Rule #1 of historical inference is to follow Hume, and Rule #1 is an absolute necessity (that is, it is not a heuristic), then there can be no usefully Bayesian approach to history.

Somebody might find that following Hume and not Laplace is desirable. Carl Sagan did, for example. Regardless, that is what is at stake in this thread and the previous one.

Neil

What follows is my position in the controversy before us. I understand that you disagree. It is my view that:

In order to be evidence, something must actually be observed. What is observed in the Bickerman case is Josephus' report. What the report describes is not evidence, so we never reach the question of whether it is primary or secondary evidence. It's not evidence, full stop. The description is the evidence, not what it describes.

Two distinct criteria for designation as primary have been proposed in the successive threads. Under one (the earlier thread's), Joephus' description lacks interpretation or traditional contamination. It is primary evidence. Under the other (the current thread's), it is later than the events for which the report is being used as evidence. It is secondary evidence.

Intuition suggests that the one and the same observation has the same bearing on the same hypotheses regardless of how the observation is labeled, primary or secondary. That implies that it is harmless to change the definition of those terms, which is what Bickerman did in your account.

It is irrelevant to the value of Josephus' report that you would prefer not to characterize Bickerman's behavior that way. It is also irrelevant that you would prefer to say that Rule #1 was diluted rather than relaxed, or that you'd prefer not to say that a different heuristic was used instead, which it was. What can be distinguished are different.

The additional investigative work Bickerman did (for example, seeking external corroboration for the report) needs no special motivation or explanation. Rule #1 itself contemplates critical examination apart from "prioritzing."

If Bickerman prefers to organize his own report by mapping his investigation onto a possible interpretation of Rule #1, then that's swell. A report of the same activities organized differently (say, prefaced by a statement like "All my observations are of things made later than the events I'm investigating, nevertheless my observations bear.") would have the same usefulness for resolving the underlying uncertainty.