Marcion we know for a ship-master, not a king or an emperor. [Against Marcion 1.18]
Picture a shipmaster ( in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, [488b] but who is slightly deaf6 and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with7 his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher8 or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all,9 but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone10 who says that it can be taught, [488c] and meanwhile they are always clustered about11 the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing12 to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out13 from the ship, and then, after binding14 and stupefying the worthy shipmaster15 with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage16 of it as is to be expected17 from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, [488d] a pilot, a master of shipcraft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand18 in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule,19 while the man who lacks this craft20 they censure as useless. They have no suspicions21 that the true pilot must give his attention22 to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm23 [488e] with or without the consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art24 and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed25 be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, [489a] a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?” “Quite so,” said Adeimantus. “You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof1 and show that the condition2 we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers.” “It is indeed,” he said. “To begin with, then, teach this parable3 to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising [489b] if they were honored.” “I will teach him,”4 he said. “And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirit among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,5 not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural6 course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich.7 The author of that epigram8 was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, [489c] and everyone who needs to be governed9 to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything.10 But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we are just describing, and those whom these call useless and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.” “Just so,” he said. “Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. [489d] But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders11 to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers12 are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted13 that what you said was true. Is not that so?” “Yes.”Republic, 488 - 489, translated by G. Ferrari.
Given that only philosophers can have knowledge, they are clearly the ones best able to grasp what is good for the city, and so are in the best position to know how to run and govern the city. If we only knew that they were virtuous—or at least not inferior to others in virtue—then, Socrates’s friends agree, we could be sure that they are the ones most fit to rule. Luckily, we do know that philosophers are superior in virtue to everyone else. A philosopher loves truth more than anything else (“philosopher” means “lover of truth or wisdom”); his entire soul strives after truth. This means that the rational part of his soul must rule, which means that his soul is just.
Adeimantus remains unconvinced. None of the philosophers he has ever known have been like Socrates is describing. Most philosophers are useless, and those that are not useless tend to be vicious. Socrates, surprisingly, agrees with Adeimantus’s condemnation of the contemporary philosopher, but he argues that the current crop of philosophers have not been raised in the right way. Men born with the philosophical nature—courageous, high-minded, quick learners, with faculties of memory—are quickly preyed upon by family and friends, who hope to benefit from their natural gifts. They are encouraged to enter politics in order to win money and power by their parasitic family and friends. So they are inevitably led away from the philosophical life. In place of the natural philosophers who are diverted away from philosophy and corrupted, other people who lack the right philosophical nature, rush in to fill the gap and become philosophers when they have no right to be. These people are vicious.
The few who are good philosophers (those whose natures were somehow not corrupted, either because they were in exile, lived in a small city, were in bad health, or by some other circumstance) are considered useless because society has become antithetical to correct ideals. He compares the situation to a ship on which the ship owner is hard of hearing, has poor vision, and lacks sea-faring skills. All of the sailors on the ship quarrel over who should be captain, though they know nothing about navigation. In lieu of any skill, they make use of brute force and clever tricks to get the ship owner to choose them as captain. Whoever is successful at persuading the ship owner to choose him is called a “navigator,” a “captain,” and “one who knows ships.” Anyone else is called “useless.” These sailors have no idea that there is a craft of navigation, or any knowledge to master in order to steer ships. In this scenario, Socrates points out, the true captain—the man who knows the craft of navigation—would be called a useless stargazer. The current situation in Athens is analogous: no one has any idea that there is real knowledge to be had, a craft to living. Instead, everyone tries to get ahead by clever, often unjust, tricks. Those few good philosophers who turn their sights toward the Forms and truly know things are deemed useless.
All that we need to make our city possible, Socrates concludes, is one such philosopher-king—one person with the right nature who is educated in the right way and comes to grasp the Forms. This, he believes, is not all that impossible.
Is
“Finally, from so little sleeping and so much reading, his brain dried up and he went completely out of his mind.”
― Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote