In another discussion I said I hadn't any idea where the name 'Paul' came from. It is clearly a secondary name, even in the Catholic tradition. This is odd in itself. The Marcionites denied the formulation of Acts that a guy with the name of Saul just changed a letter and became Paul (or more correctly changed an initial letter and added the Greek suffix 'os').
Why does Acts develop such elaborate nonsense? My guess is that it reflects the basic process for the development of the false name 'Paulos.' What do I think that was? I think we should look at Keith L. Yoder of the University of Massachusetts suggestion regarding the Adjectival ΦΑΥΛΟΣ in James 3:16. Here is his suggestion:
I suggest there is a word play on "Paul" in the final phrase of James 3:16: παν φαυλον πργμα ("every worthless thing") => παν Παυλον πραγμα ("every Paul-ish thing"). If the name "Paul" appeared within close textual context of James 3:16, a word play would be apparent. Obviously that is not the case, but if James 2:14-26 is reacting against a text or reputed teachings of Paul, then "Paul" would be in the echo chamber of James' performance arena so that readers might well sense a resonance between the two.
I would develop the suggestion slightly differently. If we suppose that Paul was called φαῦλος by Greek speaking 'Jewish Christians' the term would have been transliterated into Aramaic as ܦܘܠܘܤ. It is worth noting that this is the exact way that 'Paulos' is preserved in Syriac texts - http://studybible.info/Peshitta/1%20Corinthians%201:!
To this end, I think Irenaeus or someone before him took the unnamed apostle of the Marcionite tradition and with it the insulting name he was identified by in the rival Ebionite community - i.e. 'the evil' or 'foul' one and turned that into his proper name = Paul.
I just realized the point isn't clear enough for the unfamiliar. The Aramaic "p" was pronounced as "f" so for most relevant Aramaic speakers that word on the page was "faulos" anyway ie going back to the Greek phaulos "the foul one" the evil one etc.
Stephan Huller wrote:... The Marcionites denied the formulation of Acts that a guy with the name of Saul just changed a letter and became Paul (or more correctly changed an initial letter and added the Greek suffix 'os').
To this end, I think Irenaeus or someone before him took the unnamed apostle of the Marcionite tradition and with it the insulting name he was identified by in the rival Ebionite community - i.e. 'the evil' or 'foul' one and turned that into his proper name = Paul.
I have seen reference to a lot of the texts at the time parodying and insulting others - there was something by a John Bartram here, or on another blog of his -
The term "the poor" was at first a common designation for all Christians - a reference to their material and voluntary poverty.
Such power, indeed, does the name of Jesus possess over evil spirits, that there have been instances where it was effectual, when it was pronounced even by bad men ((Τοσοῦτον μέντοι γε δύναται τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὡς ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ὑπὸ φαύλων ὀνομαζόμενον ἀνύειν), which Jesus Himself taught (would be the case), when He said: "Many shall say to Me in that day, In Thy name we have cast out devils, and done many wonderful works." Whether Celsus omitted this from intentional malignity, or from ignorance, I do not know. And he next proceeds to bring a charge against the Saviour Himself, alleging that it was by means of sorcery that He was able to accomplish the wonders which He performed; and that foreseeing that others would attain the same knowledge, and do the same things, making a boast of doing them by help of the power of God, He excludes such from His kingdom. And his accusation is, that if they are justly excluded, while He Himself is guilty of the same practices, He is a wicked man; but if He is not guilty of wickedness in doing such things, neither are they who do the same as He (Καὶ κατηγορεῖ αὐτοῦ ὅτι, εἰ δικαίως ἀπελαύνει, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔνοχος ὢν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαῦλός ἐστιν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς οὐ φαῦλος ταῦτα ποιήσας, οὐδ' οἱ ὁμοίως αὐτῷ πράττοντες). But even if it be impossible to show by what power Jesus wrought these miracles, it is clear that Christians employ no spells or incantations, but the simple, name of Jesus, and certain other words in which they repose faith, according to the holy Scriptures. [1.5]
He says, indeed, that "we ridicule the Egyptians, although they present many by no means contemptible mysteries for our consideration (καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα), when they teach us that such rites are acts of worship offered to eternal ideas, and not, as the multitude think, to ephemeral animals; and that we are silly, because we introduce nothing nobler than the goats and dogs of the Egyptian worship in our narratives about Jesus." Now to this we reply, "Good sir, (suppose that) you are right in eulogizing the fact that the Egyptians present to view many by no means contemptible mysteries (καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρέχεσθαι αἰνίγματα), and obscure explanations about the animals (worshipped) among them, you nevertheless do not act consistently in accusing us as if you believed that we had nothing to state which was worthy of consideration, but that all our doctrines were contemptible and of no account (ἀλλὰ πάντα οὐδενὸς λόγου καὶ φαῦλα), seeing we unfold s the narratives concerning Jesus according to the ' wisdom of the word' to those who are 'perfect' in Christianity [3.19]
Now, in order to grant that there did exist a healing spirit named AEsculapius, who used to cure the bodies of men, I would say to those who are astonished at such an occurrence, or at the prophetic knowledge of Apollo, that since the cure of bodies is a thing indifferent, and a matter within the reach not merely of the good, but also of the bad (οὐκ εἰς ἀστείους μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φαύλους); and as the foreknowledge of the future is also a thing indifferent--for the possessor of foreknowledge does not necessarily manifest the possession of virtue--you must show that they who practise healing or who forefell the future are in no respect wicked, but exhibit a perfect pattern of virtue, and are not far from being regarded as gods (παραστήσατε πῶς οὐδαμῶς μέν εἰσι φαῦλοι οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἢ οἱ προγινώσκοντες παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀποδείκνυνται ἀστεῖοί τινες καὶ οὐ μακρὰν τοῦ ὑποληφθῆναι εἶναι θεοί). [3.25]
But it is probable that what is written by Paul in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, as being addressed to Greeks who prided themselves greatly on their Grecian wisdom, has moved some to believe that it was not the object of the Gospel to win wise men. Now, let him who is of this opinion understand that the Gospel, as censuring wicked men (ὥσπερ διαβάλλων ἀνθρώπους φαύλους), says of them that they are wise not in things which relate to the understanding, and which are unseen and eternal; but that in busying themselves about things of sense alone, and regarding these as all-important, they are wise men of the world [3.47]
[Celsus] comparing them to "workers in wool in private houses, and to leather-cutters, and to fullers, and to the most rustic of mankind, who carefully incite young boys to wickedness, and women to forsake their fathers and teachers, and follow them (ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα προκαλουμένους παῖδας κομιδῇ νηπίους καὶ γύναια ἵν' ἀποστῶσι μὲν πατρὸς καὶ διδασκάλων αὐτοῖς δὲ ἕπωνται)." [3.56] Origen answers "while we train to habits of self-restraint boys just reaching the age of puberty, and feeling a desire for sexual pleasures, pointing out to them not only the disgrace which attends those sins, but also the state to which the soul of the wicked is reduced through practices of that kind, and the judgments which it will suffer, and the punishments which will be inflicted (παρατιθέντες οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔσται διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡ τῶν φαύλων ψυχή, καὶ οἵας τίσει δίκας καὶ ὡς κολασθήσεται)
You, at all events, in a case where fathers deemed the mysteries of philosophy an idle and unprofitable occupation for their sons, and for young men in general, would not, in teaching philosophy, make known its secrets before worthless parents (Καὶ σὺ γοῦν τὰ φιλοσοφίας ὄργια τοῖς νέοις καὶ υἱοῖς, πατέρων ἀργὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνωφελὲς νομιζόντων φιλοσοφίαν, παραδιδοὺς τοῖς παισὶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν φαύλων πατέρων ἐρεῖς); but, desiring to keep apart those sons of wicked parents who had been turned towards the study of philosophy, you would observe the proper seasons, in order that the doctrines of philosophy might reach the minds of the young men [ibid]
The initiated of Celsus accordingly says, "Let him whose soul is conscious of no evil come." But he who acts as initiator, according to the precepts of Jesus, will say to those who have been purified in heart, "He whose soul has, for a long time, been conscious of no evil, and especially since he yielded himself to the healing of the word, let such an one hear the doctrines which were spoken in private by Jesus to His genuine disciples." Therefore in the comparison which he institutes between the procedure of the initiators into the Grecian mysteries, and the teachers of the doctrine of Jesus, he does not know the difference between inviting the wicked to be healed, and initiating those already purified into the sacred mysteries (οὐκ οἶδε διαφορὰν καλουμένων ἐπὶ μὲν θεραπείαν φαύλων ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ μυστικώτερα τῶν ἤδη καθαρωτάτων)! [3.60]
He accuses the Christian teacher, moreover of" seeking after the unintelligent (ἀνοήτους)." In answer we ask, Whom do you mean by the (ἀνοήτους)"? For, to speak accurately, every wicked man is "unintelligent (ἀνοήτους)." If then by "unintelligent" (ἀνοήτους) you mean the wicked (φαύλους), do you, in drawing men to philosophy, seek to gain the wicked (φαύλους) or the virtuous? But it is impossible to gain the virtuous, because they have already given themselves to philosophy. The wicked (φαύλους), then, but if they are wicked (φαύλους), are they "unintelligent?" And many such you seek to win over to philosophy, and you therefore seek the "unintelligent." But if I seek after those who are thus termed "unintelligent," I act like a benevolent physician, who should seek after the sick in order to help and cure them. If, bow-ever, by "unintelligent" you mean persons who are not clever, but the inferior class of men intellectually, I shall answer that I endeavour to improve such also to the best of my ability, although I would not desire to build up the Christian community out of such materials. For I seek in preference those who are more clever and acute, because they are able to comprehend the meaning of the hard sayings, and of those passages in the law, and prophecies, and Gospels, which are expressed with obscurity, and which you have despised as not containing anything worthy of notice, because you have not ascertained the meaning which they contain, nor tried to enter into the aim of the writers. [3.74]
And he produces a second illustration to our disadvantage, saying that "our teacher acts like a drunken man, who, entering a company of drunkards, should accuse those who are sober of being drunk." But let him show, say from the writings of Paul, that the apostle of Jesus gave way to drunkenness, and that his words were not those of soberness; or from the writings of John, that his thoughts do not breathe a spirit of temperance and of freedom from the intoxication of evil. No one, then, who is of sound mind, and teaches the doctrines of Christianity, gets drunk with wine; but Celsus utters these calumnies against us in a spirit very unlike that of a philosopher. Moreover, let Celsus say who those "sober" persons are whom the ambassadors of Christianity accuse. For in our judgment all are intoxicated who address themselves to inanimate objects as to God. And why do I say "intoxicated?" "Insane" would be the more appropriate word for those who hasten to temples and worship images or animals as divinities. And they too are not less insane who think that images, fashioned by men of worthless and sometimes most wicked character, confer any honour upon genuine divinities (Οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτων μαίνονται καὶ οἱ νομίζοντες εἰς τιμὴν θεῶν ἀληθινῶν κατεσκευάσθαι τὰ ὑπὸ βαναύσων καὶ φαυλοτάτων ἔσθ' ὅτε ἀνδρῶν κατασκευαζόμενα). [3.76]
But as it is in mockery that Celsus says we speak of "God coming down like a torturer bearing fire," and thus compels us unseasonably to investigate words of deeper meaning, we shall make a few remarks, sufficient to enable our hearers to form an idea of the defence which disposes of the ridicule of Celsus against us, and then we shall turn to what follows. The divine word says that our God is "a consuming fire," and that "He draws rivers of fire before Him;" nay, that He even entereth in as "a refiner's fire, and as a fuller's herb," to purify His own people. But when He is said to be a "consuming fire," we inquire what are the things which are appropriate to be consumed by God. God consumes as a fire. The wicked man (ὁ φαῦλος), accordingly, is said to build up on the previously-laid foundation of reason, "wood, and hay, and stubble." If, then, any one can show that these words were differently understood by the writer, and can prove that the wicked man (τὸν φαῦλον) literally builds up "wood, or hay, or stubble," it is evident that the fire must be understood to be material, and an object of sense. But if, on the contrary, the works of the wicked man (τοῦ φαύλου ἔργα) are spoken of figuratively under the names of "wood, or hay, or stubble," why does it not at once occur (to inquire) in what sense the word "fire" is to be taken, so that "wood" of such a kind should be consumed? for (the Scripture) says: "The fire will try each man's work of what sort it is. [4.13]
But if you depreciate the littleness of man, not on account of his body, but of his soul, regarding it as inferior to that of other rational beings, and especially of those who are virtuous; and inferior, because evil dwells in it,--why should those among Christians who are wicked, and those among the Jews who lead sinful lives (οἱ ἐν Χριστιανοῖς φαῦλοι καὶ οἱ ἐν Ἰουδαίοις κακῶς), be termed a collection of bats, or ants, or worms, or frogs, rather than those individuals among other nations who are guilty of wickedness?--seeing, in this respect, any individual whatever, especially if carried away by the tide of evil, is, in comparison with the rest of mankind, a bat, and worm, and frog, and ant ... For reason, having its beginning in the reason of God, cannot allow of the rational animal being considered wholly alien from Deity. Nor can those among Christians and Jews who are wicked, and who, in truth, are neither Christians nor Jews, be compared, more than other wicked men, to worms rolling in a corner of a dunghill (οἱ ἐν Χριστιανοῖς καὶ Ἰουδαίοις φαῦλοι καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐ Χριστιανοὶ οὐδὲ Ἰουδαῖοι, τῶν λοιπῶν φαύλων παραβάλλοιντο ἐν γωνίᾳ βορβόρου καλινδουμένοις σκώληξιν). And if the nature of reason will not permit of such comparisons, it is manifest that we must not calumniate human nature, which has been formed for virtue, even if it should sin through ignorance, nor liken it to animals of the kind described. [4.25]
Celsus, moreover, sneers at the "hatred" of Esau (to which, I suppose, he refers) against Jacob, although he was a man who, according to the Scriptures, is acknowledged to have been wicked (ἀνδρὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ὁμολογουμένου φαύλου) [4.46]
[Speaking of a famous Christian text] I do not know, indeed, how he could conjoin things that do not admit of union, and which cannot exist together at the same time in human nature, in saying, as he did, that "the above treatise deserved to be treated both with pity and hatred." For every one will admit that he who is the object of pity is not at the same moment an object of hatred, and that he who is the object of hatred is not at the same time a subject of pity. Celsus, moreover, says that it was not his purpose to refute such statements, because he thinks that their absurdity is evident to all, and that, even before offering any logical refutation, they will appear to be bad, and to merit both pity and hatred (ὡς φαῦλα καὶ ἐλέους καὶ μίσους ἄξια). [4.53]
For it would, indeed, be absurd that certain stones and buildings should be regarded as more sacred or more profane than others, according as they were constructed for the honour of God, or for the reception of dishonourable and accursed persons; while bodies should not differ from bodies, according as they are inhabited by rational or irrational beings, and according as these rational beings are the most virtuous or most worthless of mankind (τοὺς φαυλοτάτους ἀνθρώπους). Such a principle of distinction, indeed, has led some to deify the bodies of distinguished men, as having received a virtuous soul, and to reject and treat with dishonour those of very wicked individuals (τῶν φαυλοτάτων). [4.56]
Celsus has made a statement regarding evils of the following nature, viz., that "although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it is so; for you do not know what is of advantage to yourself, or to another, or to the whole world." Now this assertion is made with a certain degree of caution; and it hints that the nature of evil is not wholly wicked, because that which may be considered so in individual cases, may contain something which is of advantage to the whole community. However, lest any one should mistake my words, and find a pretence of wrongdoing, as if his wickedness were profitable to the world, or at least might be so, we have to say, that although God, who preserves the free-will of each individual, may make use of the evil of the wicked (τῇ κακίᾳ τῶν φαύλων) for the administration of the world, so disposing them as to conduce to the benefit of the whole; yet, notwithstanding, such an individual is deserving of censure, and as such has been appointed for a use, which is a subject of loathing to each separate individual, although of advantage to the whole community ... Paul also, the apostle of Jesus, teaches us that even the very wicked will contribute to the good of the whole ( τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους), while in themselves they will be amongst the vile, but that the most virtuous men, too, will be of the greatest advantage to the world, and will therefore on that account occupy the noblest position. His words are: "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's use, prepared unto every good work." These remarks I have thought it necessary to make in reply to the assertion, that "although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it is so, for you do not know what is of advantage either to yourself or to another," in order that no one may take occasion from what has been said on the subject to commit sin, on the pretext that he will thus be useful to the world. [4.70]
Observe, now, here at the very beginning, how, in ridiculing the doctrine of a conflagration of the world, held by certain of the Greeks who have treated the subject in a philosophic spirit not to be depreciated, he would make us, "representing God, as it were, as a cook, hold the belief in a general conflagration;" not perceiving that, as certain Greeks were of opinion (perhaps having received their information from the ancient nation of the Hebrews), it is a purificatory fire which is brought upon the world, and probably also on each one of those who stand in need of chastisement by the fire and healing at the same time, seeing it burns indeed, but does not consume, those who are without a material body, which needs to be consumed by that fire, and which burns and consumes those who by their actions, words, and thoughts have built up wood, or hay, or stubble, in that which is figuratively termed a "building." And the holy Scriptures say that the Lord will, like a refiner's fire and fullers' soap, visit each one of those who require purification, because of the intermingling in them of a flood of wicked matter proceeding from their evil nature ( διὰ τὸ ἀναμεμῖχθαι οἱονεὶ φαύλην χυτὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας); who need fire, I mean, to refine, as it were, (the dross of) those who are intermingled with copper, and tin, and lead. [5.15]
And there is no truth in the statement of Celsus, that "God does the most shameless deeds, or suffers the most shameless sufferings" or that "He favours the commission of evil"; for whatever he may say, no such things have ever been foretold. He ought to have cited from the prophets the passages in which God is represented as favouring evil, or as doing and enduring the most shameless deeds, and not to have sought without foundation to prejudice the minds of his readers ... He goes on to explain what those most shameful and degrading things were which Christ suffered, in these words: "For what better was it for God to eat the flesh of sheep, or to drink vinegar and gall, than to feed on filth?" But God, according to us, did not eat the flesh of sheep; and while it may seem that Jesus ate, He did so only as possessing a body. But in regard to the vinegar and gall mentioned in the prophecy, "They gave me also gall for my meat; and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink," we have already referred to this point; and as Celsus compels us to recur to it again, we would only say further, that those who resist the word of truth do ever offer to Christ the Son of God the gall of their own wickedness (ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα τροπῆς προσάγουσι τῷ Χριστῷ τοῦ θεοῦ), and the vinegar of their evil inclinations; but though He tastes of it, yet He will not drink it. [7.13]
But when we regard the Saviour as God the Word, and Wisdom, and Righteousness, and Truth, we certainly do say that He has dominion over all things which have been subjected to Him in this capacity, but not that His dominion extends over the God and Father who is Ruler over all. Besides, as the Word rules over none against their will, there are still wicked beings--not only men, but also angels, and all demons (ἔτι φαῦλοι οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωποι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ πάντες δαίμονες)--over whom we say that in a sense He does not rule, since they do not yield Him a willing obedience [8.15]
Celsus says that "the demons belong to God, and are therefore to be believed, to be sacrificed to according to laws, and to be prayed to that they may be propitious." Those who are disposed to learn, must know that the word of God nowhere says of evil things (τῶν φαύλων) that they belong to God, for it judges them unworthy of such a Lord. Accordingly, it is not all men who bear the name of "men of God," but only those who are worthy of God,--such as Moses and Elias, and any others who are so called, or such as resemble those who are so called in Scripture. In the same way, all angels are not said to be angels of God, but only those that are blessed: those that have fallen away into sin are called "angels of the devil," just as bad men (οἱ φαῦλοι ἄνθρωποι) are called "men of sin," "sons of perdition," or "sons of iniquity." Since, then, among men some are good and others bad (οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι), and the former are said to be God's and the latter the devil's, so among angels some are angels of God, and others angels of the devil. But among demons there is no such dis tinction, for all are said to be wicked (φαῦλοι). We do not therefore hesitate to say that Celsus is false when he says, "If they are demons, it is evident that they must also belong to God." He must either show that this distinction of good and bad among angels and men has no foundation, or else that a similar distinction may be shown to hold among demons. If that is impossible, it is plain that demons do not belong to God; for their prince is not God, but, as holy Scripture says, "Beelzebub." [8.25]
And we are not to believe in demons, although Celsus urges us to do so; but if we are to obey God, we must die, or endure anything, sooner than obey demons. In the same way, we are not to propitiate demons; for it is impossible to propitiate beings that are wicked (ἐστι τοῖς φαύλοις) and that seek the injury of men. Besides, what are the laws in accordance with which Celsus would have us propitiate the demons? For if he means laws enacted in states, he must show that they are in agreement with the divine laws. But if that cannot be done, as the laws of many states are quite inconsistent with each other, these laws, therefore, must of necessity either be no laws at all in the proper sense of the word, or else the enactments of wicked men (φαύλων νόμους); and these we must not obey, for "we must obey God rather than men." [8.26]
I am starting to see the possibility that the group that followed the apostle might well have identified itself (or part of its community) as οἱ φαῦλοι. Think about it. There is always this idea of 'the Ebionites' which are supposed to be a community of Aramaic speaking Christians who called themselves 'the poor.' Origen hints at the Greek equivalent of this term as οἱ φαῦλοι in his discussion of Mark chapter 10. What is the most distinguishing feature of this community? Their rejection of an apostle identified by the name 'Paul.'
Origen repeatedly says that the φαῦλοι can be angels, demons or men. They are defined as being alienated from Christ. They are under the authority of the Devil. But Origen elsewhere repeatedly acknowledges the act of 'redemption' which is defined as Christ 'purchasing' individuals from the Devil. What if somehow οἱ φαῦλοι was a term used to describe those who were in the process of coming over to Christ within a community like that of the Marcionites. The apostle certainly fit in that group before his conversion. But was he the very first to completely 'come over' and be purchased by Christ?
I wonder whether the apostle identified himself as φαῦλος before his conversion - i.e. the antithesis of what now appears in the Catholic NT where 'Paul' is the conversion name of the apostle after being called something else before.
For those who are interested, Origen didn't make up the idea that the apostle describes ὁ φαῦλος in relation to 1 Corinthians 3:
But if, on the contrary, the works of the wicked man (τοῦ φαύλου ἔργα) are spoken of figuratively under the names of "wood, or hay, or stubble," why does it not at once occur (to inquire) in what sense the word "fire" is to be taken, so that "wood" of such a kind should be consumed? for (the Scripture) says: "The fire will try each man's work of what sort it is. [4.13] etc
The same idea appears in Clement of Alexandria:
“According to the grace,” it is said, “given to me as a wise master builder, I have laid the foundation. And another buildeth on it gold and silver, precious stones.” (1 Cor. iii. 10–13) Such is the gnostic superstructure on the foundation of faith in Christ Jesus. But “the stubble, and the wood, and the hay,” are the additions of heresies. “But the fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is.” In allusion to the gnostic edifice also in the Epistle to the Romans, he says, “For I desire to see you, that I may impart unto you a spiritual gift, that ye may be established.” Rom. i. 11. It was impossible that gifts of this sort could be written without disguise. [Clement Stromata 5.4]
I wonder if Jesus is understood to speak through the apostle when he says that the wise master builder established the foundation and he (the apostle) and others have built upon that original foundation.
And, as we said before, the foul demons (οἱ φαῦλοι δαίμονες) put forward Marcion of Pontus, who is even now teaching men to deny that God is the maker of all things in heaven and on earth, and that the Christ predicted by the prophets is His Son, and preaches another god besides the Creator of all, and likewise another son. And this man many have believed, as if he alone knew the truth, and laugh at us, though they have no proof of what they say, but are carried away irrationally as lambs by a wolf, and become the prey of atheistical doctrines, and of devils. For they who are called devils attempt nothing else than to seduce men from God who made them, and from Christ His first-begotten; and those who are unable to raise themselves above the earth they have riveted, and do now rivet, to things earthly, and to the works of their own hands; but those who devote themselves to the contemplation of things divine, they secretly beat back; and if they have not a wise sober-mindedness, and a pure and passionless life, they drive them into godlessness. [1 Apol 58]
Compare Ephrem against the Heresies 23
Not everyone who makes disciples
Calls his disciples by his own name.
The apostle to the nations [Paul] made disciples,
But he named no one with his name.
The name with which he made them disciples,
In that name he baptized them;
The name in which he baptized them,
The same he had them worship.
To that name he ascribed everything.
Response: Blessed is the one to whom everything is due!
A certain demon among the Greeks,
When he began to introduce whoredom,
He feigned himself [to be something he was not] to each one 5
By means of that which was comely to it [the church] .
And today, in various manners,
He has seduced the simple (= οἱ φαῦλοι would be the Greek equivalent).
Sometimes he captures it [the church] with fasting,
Sometimes with sackcloth and vegetables,
And sometimes he takes it captive with speech.
Response: Blessed is the one who brings his wiles to naught!
I find the two passages strikingly similar. First of all, if we imagine that Justin the father of Tatian might well have been connected to Ephrem by means of the Diatessaron, let's suppose for a minute that this early Christian tradition went back to a Greek church. The 'simple' here = οἱ φαῦλοι. What would the name that they baptized these φαῦλοι? Now all of a sudden the context of χρηστός suddenly makes sense.
χρηστός is the exact opposite meaning of φαῦλος.
This is extremely significant. Suddenly we have the context for which χρηστός fits within a Christian milieu. On the one hand there is humanity as such defined as οἱ φαῦλοι that is 'evil or 'the worthless' and then a solitary holy figure called 'the good one' or useful one (see the nice contrast!). I never could figure out a proper fit for χρηστός. And here is something more from Lactantius.
Some one may perhaps ask who this is who is so powerful, so beloved by God, and what name He has, who was not only begotten at first before the world, but who also arranged it by His wisdom and constructed it by His might. First of all, it is befitting that we should know that His name is not known even to the angels who dwell in heaven, but to Himself only, and to God the Father; nor will that name be published, as the sacred writings relate, before that the purpose of God shall be fulfilled. In the next place, we must know that this name cannot be uttered by the mouth of man, as Hermes teaches, saying these things: Now the cause of this cause is the will of the divine good which produced God, whose name cannot be uttered by the mouth of man. And shortly afterwards to His Son: There is, O Son, a secret word of wisdom, holy respecting the only Lord of all things, and the God first perceived by the mind, to speak of whom is beyond the power of man. But although His name, which the supreme Father gave Him from the beginning, is known to none but Himself, nevertheless He has one name among the angels, and another among men, since He is called Jesus among men: for Christ is not a proper name, but a title of power and dominion; for by this the Jews were accustomed to call their kings.
But the meaning of this name must be set forth, on account of the error of the ignorant, who by the change of a letter are accustomed to call Him Chrestus. The Jews had before been directed to compose a sacred oil, with which those who were called to the priesthood or to the kingdom might be anointed. And as now the robe of purple is a sign of the assumption of royal dignity among the Romans, so with them the anointing with the holy oil conferred the title and power of king. But since the ancient Greeks used the word anointing (χρίεσθαι), which they now express by anointed them with oil (ἀλείφεσθαι) as the verse of Homer shows,
“But the attendants washed, and anointed (χρισαν) them with oil;”
on this account we call Him Christ, that is, the Anointed, who in Hebrew is called the Messias. Hence in some Greek writings, which are badly translated from the Hebrew, the word eleimmenos (ἠλειμμένος) is found written, from the word aleiphesthai (ἀλείφεσθαι), anointing. But, however, by either name a king is signified: not that He has obtained this earthly kingdom, the time for receiving which has not yet arrived, but that He sways a heavenly and eternal kingdom, concerning which we shall speak in the last book. But now let us speak of His first nativity. [Lactantius Divine Institutes 4.7]
I think then we have found an important touchstone for a lot of independent ideas. On the one hand, the reason why Jesus was called Chrestos (the good, useful one) was because humanity as such is identified as 'bad and useless). The juxtaposition of the two terms was especially key to Aristotle who in the Rhetoric says:
that 'good' (epieikês or chrêstos) people feel indignation and emulation, while 'bad' (phaulos) people feel envy, Aristotle appears to suggest there are only two types of characters (ethos): good and bad. http://books.google.com/books?id=r5dKAg ... 22&f=false
I have always taken Aristotle to basically outline the common understanding of things. So in the Greek world chrêstos and phaulos were on each end of an ethical axis in the ancient worldview.
Now when we see from Lactantius that 'the common' (= οἱ φαῦλοι) called Jesus ὁ χρηστός we begin to see that through baptism at least the idea was planted that they would be transformed into οἱ χρηστοί at least spiritually. χρηστοί was a term that the Athenian aristocracy referred to themselves as.
At the very least then there is the grounds for identifying the common within Christianity (= οἱ φαῦλοι) as being devoted to the apostle in a manner which reflected Marcionism as a whole hence the underlying commonality in identifying Jesus as ὁ χρηστός.
Interesting thoughts, Stephan. Now I'm going to have to read Aristotle's Rhetoric for more.
“The only sensible response to fragmented, slowly but randomly accruing evidence is radical open-mindedness. A single, simple explanation for a historical event is generally a failure of imagination, not a triumph of induction.” William H.C. Propp
Stephan Huller wrote:I am starting to see the possibility that the group that followed the apostle might well have identified itself (or part of its community) as οἱ φαῦλοι. Think about it. There is always this idea of 'the Ebionites' which are supposed to be a community of Aramaic speaking Christians who called themselves 'the poor.' Origen hints at the Greek equivalent of this term as οἱ φαῦλοι in his discussion of Mark chapter 10. What is the most distinguishing feature of this community? Their rejection of an apostle identified by the name 'Paul.'
Origen repeatedly says that the φαῦλοι can be angels, demons or men. They are defined as being alienated from Christ. They are under the authority of the Devil. But Origen elsewhere repeatedly acknowledges the act of 'redemption' which is defined as Christ 'purchasing' individuals from the Devil. What if somehow οἱ φαῦλοι was a term used to describe those who were in the process of coming over to Christ within a community like that of the Marcionites. The apostle certainly fit in that group before his conversion. But was he the very first to completely 'come over' and be purchased by Christ?
I wonder whether the apostle identified himself as φαῦλος before his conversion - i.e. the antithesis of what now appears in the Catholic NT where 'Paul' is the conversion name of the apostle after being called something else before.
Stephan Huller wrote:.
I think then we have found an important touchstone for a lot of independent ideas. On the one hand, the reason why Jesus was called Chrestos (the good, useful one) was because humanity as such is identified as 'bad and useless. The juxtaposition of the two terms was especially key to Aristotle who in the Rhetoric says:
that 'good' (epieikês or chrêstos) people feel indignation and emulation, while 'bad' (phaulos) people feel envy, Aristotle appears to suggest there are only two types of characters (ethos): good and bad. http://books.google.com/books?id=r5dKAg ... 22&f=false
I have always taken Aristotle to basically outline the common understanding of things. So in the Greek world chrêstos and phaulos were on each end of an ethical axis in the ancient worldview.
Now when we see from Lactantius that 'the common' (= οἱ φαῦλοι) called Jesus ὁ χρηστός we begin to see that through baptism at least the idea was planted that they would be transformed into οἱ χρηστοί at least spiritually. χρηστοί was a term that the Athenian aristocracy referred to themselves as.
At the very least then there is the grounds for identifying the common within Christianity (= οἱ φαῦλοι) as being devoted to the apostle in a manner which reflected Marcionism as a whole hence the underlying commonality in identifying Jesus as ὁ χρηστός.
Satornilus seems to suggest that Adam was ὁ φαῦλος
For Satornilus claims that two men were fashioned at the first, one good and one evil (ἕνα ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕνα φαῦλον). Descended from these are two breeds of men in the world, the good and the evil. But since the demons were assisting the evil, for this reason the Saviour came, as I said, in the last days, to the aid of the good men and for the destruction of the evil and the demons [Epiphanius Panarion 23.2]
Or why not reply to the myth-maker with the question, 'Did the power on high know what they would do?' 'Yes,' he says. 'Very well, if it knew, then it, not they, made the man. And if it knew but didn't want it done, and they still undertook the project themselves against its wishes, why didn't it stop them? But if it had no way of stopping them, this is its first fault (πρώτη φαυλότης). It created the angels it has made to its own disadvantage, in opposition to itself and for its own provocation; and in the second place, it could have stopped them but didn't, and instead lent its assistance to the evil work that was done by the angels.
On the Carpocratians:
And for the rest it's a yarn and nonsense—with the ones below able to rise above the ones in the middle, and the ones in the middle being punished for being the causes of the ones below—and the ones below, I mean the souls of the ones in this creation, being brought safely past the ones in the middle to the One above, and set free. And the One above, who cannot create, must be adjudged feeble, but his creatures must be adjudged powerful, since they could make the things he did not want made, or wanted to make but couldn't. 7:7 For what he desires cannot be bad for him or be produced by beings which are bad. If it were bad, it should perish. But if any part of the work is preserved, the work cannot be bad—even if (only) part of it is going to be preserved. Nor can its makers be bad, the ones who executed the part that is going to be preserved. (εἰ δὲ ὅλως μέρος τι τοῦ ἔργου σῴζεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ἔργον φαῦλον, κἄν τε μέρος αὐτοῦ σῳζόμενον εὑρίσκοιτο, οὔτε οἱ ποιήσαντες φαῦλοι οἱ τὸ σῳζόμενον τεχνησάμενοι). And if the soul does come from angels, and receives power from on high after being brought into being, then all the more will angels attain salvation—since the soul they produced is saved although it comes from bad beings! And if it is saved, then neither the soul itself which was made by the angels, nor the angels whose product the soul is, can be bad. (εἰ δὲ ὅλως ἐξ ἀγγέλων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄνωθεν λαμβάνει δύναμιν παραχθεῖσα, ἄρα γε οἱ ἄγγελοι πλέον σωτηρίας τεύξονται, ὅτι ἡ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ψυχὴ σῴζεται, ἐκ φαύλων οὖσα. σῳζομένης δὲ αὐτῆς οὐκέτι φαῦλος οὔτε αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ γενομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγγέλων οὔτε οἱ ἄγγελοι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει).
On Marcion's middle god as 'faulos'
And how can the soul come by itself ? How can it reign by itself, when it did good or evil together with a body (σὺν σώματι ἐργασαμένη τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ φαῦλον)? The judgment will not be just, but the reverse! And how can Marcion's own tally of three principles be substantiated? How can the one which does work—either the work of salvation, or the other kinds—in the bad god's territory be considered 'good'? (πῶς δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς εὑρεθήσεται ὁ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ φαύλου μέρεσιν ἔργον ἐπιτελῶν ἢ σωτηρίας ἢ τῶν ἄλλων) 6:2 For suppose the world does not belong to him, and yet he sent his Only-begotten into the world to take things from someone else's world, which he neither begot nor made—it will be found, either that he is invading someone else's domain or that, being poor and having nothing of his own, he is advancing against another person's territory to procure things which he does not already have.
And how can the demiurge act as judge between both parties? Whom can he judge, then? If he presides as judge over the articles which have been taken from the God on high, he is more powerful than the God on high—seeing that he hales the possessions of the God on high into his court, or so Marcion thought. And if he is a judge at all, he is just. But from the word, 'just,' I shall show that goodness and justice are the same thing. Anything that is just is also good.
It is because of his being good that, with impartial justice, God grants what is good to one who has done good. And he cannot be opposed to the good God in point of goodness, since he provides the good with good on the principle of justice, and the bad with the penalty of retribution. (κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ παρέχων καὶ τῷ φαύλῳ τὴν ἐπιτιμίαν τῆς τιμωρίας). Nor, again, can he be good if he gives the good reward to the unrepentantly evil at the end, even though for now he makes his sun rise on good and evil men and provides them with his rain, because of their freedom of choice at this present (οὐδὲ πάλιν ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τῷ πονηρῷ τὸν ἀγαθὸν μισθὸν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει ἀποδιδοὺς μὴ μετανοοῦντι, εἰ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνατέλλοι αὐτοῦ τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ φαύλους καὶ τὸν ὑετὸν αὐτοῦ παρέχοι διὰ τὸ νῦν αὐτεξούσιον τοῖς τε πονηροῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνθρώποις). The nature of a God who provides the evil with the reward of salvation in the world to come, and does not rather hate what is wicked and evil, cannot be good and just. ( ἀγαθὴ γὰρ οὐκέτι ἔσται φύσις καὶ δικαία τοῦ τῷ πονηρῷ μισθὸν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι σωτηρίας παρέχοντος καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον μισοῦντος τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον)
But as to Marcion's third, evil god. If he has the power to do evil things and master either the denizens of the world who belong to the God on high or the ones who belong to the intermediate, just God—then this god must be stronger than the two whom Marcion calls Gods, since he has the power to seize what is not his. And then the two will be adjudged weaker than the one evil god, since they are powerless to resist and rescue their possessions from the one who is seizing them and turning them into evil.
And again:
But again, tell me, how did the three principles come to be? And who was it that set a boundary for them? If each is enclosed in its own space, then these three, which are enclosed in certain places that contain them, cannot be considered perfect. The thing that contains each one must be greater than the thing that is contained. And the thing that is contained can no longer be called 'God' but rather, the boundary which contains it must (be so called). But even if, when they met, each one was allotted its own place by concession and, being in its own place, no principle crowds or encroaches on another, the principles cannot be opposed to each other, and none of them can be considered evil (οὐδέ τις αὐτῶν φαύλη εὑρεθήσετα). They mind their own business in a just, calm and tranquil fashion, and do not try to overstep
and again
It is impossible for anything that has a beginning to be everlasting unless the Existent should will it—the Cause of that which once did not exist, but had a beginning of existence. Now 'the Existent' is Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the non-existent are all created things, which have had a beginning of existence. Among these is that which is called, and is, evil, which began with men, who came into existence but at one time did not exist. But since evil began at the same time that man began, who once did not exist, there will also be a time when evil will no longer exist. It will undoubtedly be eliminated, since the Existent does not consent to a thing that had a beginning and then placed itself among evil things ( ἐν φαύλοις ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντι). For it will be brought to an end after the resurrection. And not only then. It has been brought to an end since the proclamation of the Law—and even before the Law by many who have lived by the law of nature, and still more, surely, since Christ’s incarnation.
and again
'For not the hearers of the Law are just before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified.' If the Law, when kept, justifies the person who keeps it, then the Law on account of which those who keep the Law are constituted righteous, is not unrighteous or bad (οὐκ ἄδικος ὁ νόμος οὔτε φαῦλος).
