Richard Carrier's decisive point on Justin's Trypho

[mlinssen]

But the bottom line is, of course, that Justin can demonstrate nothing at all whatsoever: Christ, Jesus, Chrest, Geewsus - all fables

It is clear who is touching the elephant here and who is touching something entirely different. I guess de Nile is not just a river in Egypt. softandmushy.jpeg

[Chrissy Hansen]

No they don't. Bermejo-Rubio is literally saying that it isn't clear what is being referred to here. You can take it as confirmation if you wish, but that is a misconstrual at best. He is simply saying it is possible that people may have these doubts, but he provides no evidence and his once citation he says is vague and we don't know.

Bermejo-Rubio's view marks already a progress in comparison to your view, since he concedes that Trypho may be doubting the storicity of Jesus, whereas you deny absolutely a such possibility.

I never denied it is a possbility. I denied that it is remotely probable. I would note that it isn't "progress". Van Voorst also noted it may be possible in a footnote, but he doubts that it is probable.

People saying something is "possible" is not saying anything meaningful at all. Literally anything is "possible" if you stretch enough.

[Chrissy Hansen]

Until Carrier can point to an explicit example of Trypho saying Jesus never existed (not claims that the Christ does not exist, which is a separate issue), I will remain completely unconvinced, no matter how many chiastic structures he conjures up.

Why do you insist so strongly upon the need for explicit proof in this area? People regularly derive valid truths from things which, although not explicitly stated within a text, are unavoidably inferred. Mythicists say that Trypho was being presented as denying that Jesus was a historical person, and at least one historicist, as you concede, made the same argument. So the possbility remains, in my opinion, that the original Christian perspective was the same. After all, many Christians to this day regard the terms Jesus and Christ as interchangeable, and organizing arguments chiastically is a reasonable way to do such a thing.

In any case, what I find to be truly fascinating about the dialogue between Trypho and Justin is that Justin, in defending the Christians' claims about Jesus/Christ, does not try to emphasize that the Christians' accounts about Jesus were by trustworthy people who had experienced actual events, but instead appeals to miracles and the Jews' scriptures.

Because in this instance the wording is vague enough that without an explicit note, we cannot make any sure claims that this is about Jesus' historicity whatsoever. Carrier has this habit of taking vague things, reading a bunch into them, and claiming his speculations are the only correct way to read the passage, when in reality it in no way clearly intimates his views.

I see no reason to think this is even inferred, and his chiastic structures do nothing to prove this in my view, since it is consistent on both positions.

And since the dialogue is completely invented by Justin, the fact that he never addresses the claim that Jesus did not exist, to me, is proof enough that this was never intended as thea meaning in the passage. Justin didn't invent accusations and then not address them... he does of course address the claim that Jesus was not the messiah though. Hence, my position.

[Chrissy Hansen]

No they don't. Bermejo-Rubio is literally saying that it isn't clear what is being referred to here. You can take it as confirmation if you wish

And why should we not? When position A is asserted by the majority to be the true position, and a minority argues that in fact position B is the true position, then surely a concession that the evidence which both sides cite in fact cannot decisively support either position greatly strengthens the arguments advocated by supporters of position B, even unto perhaps confirming that position B is correct when advocates for position B rely upon evidence which position B's supporters do not consider.

No it doesn't. If the evidence doesn't not support either side, then it does not bolster anyone's position whatsoever.

If I make X argument, and I claim Y is evidence, and Y is then shown to be too vague to tell and could also be evidence of Z (Bermejo-Rubio), and thus cannot be told in either direction, then argument X has no support from Y. Y is too vague to be evidence of anything at that point. Thus, worthless.

[Giuseppe]

No they don't. Bermejo-Rubio is literally saying that it isn't clear what is being referred to here. You can take it as confirmation if you wish, but that is a misconstrual at best. He is simply saying it is possible that people may have these doubts, but he provides no evidence and his once citation he says is vague and we don't know.

Bermejo-Rubio's view marks already a progress in comparison to your view, since he concedes that Trypho may be doubting the storicity of Jesus, whereas you deny absolutely a such possibility.

I never denied it is a possbility. I denied that it is remotely probable.

Good to know. Hence you recognize humbly that you go against the Bermejo-Rubio's view and the Feldman's view (i.e. against an academic view).

[Chrissy Hansen]

Okay... they are in the stark minority on this, as I have noted in my paper. So yes, I am against them (not so much Bermejo-Rubio though, given he thinks it is vague so he is just against everyone, Feldman and me).

[Giuseppe]

Okay... they are in the stark minority on this, as I have noted in my paper. So yes, I am against them (not so much Bermejo-Rubio though, given he thinks it is vague so he is just against everyone, Feldman and me).

He thinks that it is fifty-fifty, just as Doherty does. Hence, relatively to Trypho, I note that Feldman is more 'mythicist' than Earl Doherty.

[Chrissy Hansen]

He did not say it was fifty fifty. Saying something is possible, is not assigning it equal odds to the alternative. He argues it is not "clear" and says we cannot tell for sure, but that is not the same as saying equal odds. Anyways, I'm done arguing that point. It is still a minority position that most scholars do not uphold.

[Giuseppe]

He did not say it was fifty fifty. Saying something is possible, is not assigning it equal odds to the alternative.

Prof Bermejo-Rubio has based his claim that the expression is generic on the book of Doherty published in 2009 and gives the references to the pages where Doherty concludes that it is fifty-fifty.

He says that 'the suspicion can be arisen already in the antiquity'. He doesn't say: 'the suspicion may be arisen already in the antiquity'. In Italian language, 'può' is a more strong claim than 'potrebbe'.

[ABuddhist]

No they don't. Bermejo-Rubio is literally saying that it isn't clear what is being referred to here. You can take it as confirmation if you wish

And why should we not? When position A is asserted by the majority to be the true position, and a minority argues that in fact position B is the true position, then surely a concession that the evidence which both sides cite in fact cannot decisively support either position greatly strengthens the arguments advocated by supporters of position B, even unto perhaps confirming that position B is correct when advocates for position B rely upon evidence which position B's supporters do not consider.

No it doesn't. If the evidence doesn't not support either side, then it does not bolster anyone's position whatsoever.

If I make X argument, and I claim Y is evidence, and Y is then shown to be too vague to tell and could also be evidence of Z (Bermejo-Rubio), and thus cannot be told in either direction, then argument X has no support from Y. Y is too vague to be evidence of anything at that point. Thus, worthless.

But the evidence, having once been cited in support of argument X and now being eliminated, may make argument Z stronger having been eliminated.