Trinitarian Interpolations

[Secret Alias]

So does Justin's pseudo dialogue

And?

[mbuckley3]

There is something I read recently, forgetting the reference, but I found it very interesting.

Some ancient Christians identified the "Beginning" in the first words of Genesis, "in the beginning," with the Son.

For the record, Jerome's Hebrew Questions on Genesis :

" 1: 1 'In the beginning, God made the heaven and the earth.' As it is written in the dispute between Jason and Papiscus, and as Tertullian reckons in the book against Praxeas, and as Hilary also asserts in the exposition of a certain Psalm, most people think that in the Hebrew is contained 'In the Son, God made heaven and earth,' which the facts of the matter itself prove to be mistaken. For both the Septuagint, and Symmachus and Theodotion, translated it as 'In the beginning;' and in the Hebrew is written 'bresith' (which Aquila understands as 'In the chapter') and not 'baben,' which would mean 'In the Son.' So the verse can be applied to Christ more in respect of its intention than following its literal translation." (tr. Robert Hayward)

[MrMacSon]

There's threefold/tripartite stuff in Plutarch which, apparently, he gets from Aristotle.

And Valentinianism follows suit:

... Plutarch distinguishes both in the world and in human beings three aspects, body, soul, and intellect. The soul's concern with the body gives rise to the non-rational aspect, which amounts to disorder, vice, or badness, while the co-operation between soul and intellect promotes rationality, that is, order, virtue, benevolence ...


3. Logic/Epistemology

... Plutarch distinguishes between three different movements in the soul, which are identical to those assumed by the Stoics, namely those of sensation ((phantastikon), impulse (hormê), and assent (synkatathetikon; Adv. Col. 1122B) ...


4. Metaphysics
4.1 First Principles

... in Plutarch's view God, as Osiris, can be analyzed into three elements, intellect, soul, and body (De Iside 373A) ...


5. Psychology

... For Plutarch the threefold distinction of the individual person (body, soul, and intellect) has its equivalent in the universe at large. As the human soul is intermediary between body and intellect, similarly, Plutarch claims, the world soul is intermediary between earth and sun (De facie 943A, 945A, De virtute morali 441D; see Deuse 1985, 45–47, Opsomer 1994). In both the human being and the world, the intellect is external to the soul (cf. Phaedrus 247c–d); the world soul is informed by the reason of the Creator God, the Demiurge, while, in the case of humans, the intellect amounts to the “daimôn” assigned to each of us (De genio Socratis 591E), which is what Republic 620d and, especially, Timaeus 90a-d suggest. Ultimately both the world soul and the human souls are informed by reason and become rational by coming into contact with the divine intellect ...


6. Ethics and Politics
...[...]
Interestingly, Plutarch does not refer to the Timaeus to support his theory of the tripartite soul, but rather to Aristotle (De virtute morali 442B-C), whom Plutarch, like most ancient and modern commentators, recognizes as adopting essential aspects of Plato's doctrine. The essential feature that Aristotle shares with Plato is the belief in rational and non-rational aspects of the soul. This accounts for unself-controlled actions that, Plutarch thinks, prove how mistaken is the Stoic conception of human agency as deriving from reason alone. Plutarch also relies largely on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics with regard to the nature of virtue ...

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plutarch/

In a famous section of the myth included in in this text [De facie], Sylla[/Sulla(?)] corrects the widespread bipartite conception of the human being and, in so doing, for the first time in ancient literature [Plutarch] defines a tripartite view of man [De facie 943A; herein, below]. Even if frequently implied in numerous ancient sources,³⁹ Sylla’s assertion in De facie is our first explicit mention of the human trichotomy.⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, Sylla’s tripartition also assumes a clear hierarchy among the parts of the human being, such as Valentinian texts will also do: “{I}n the same degree as soul is superior to body, so is mind better and more divine than human soul” ...

³⁹ The tripartite view of the human being arises from Aristotle, who considered that only the intellect is divine and immortal, while soul and body were mortal

⁴⁰ Besides Plutarch’s De facie, also De genio 591D–F (below) mentions this trichotomy explicitly. Other passages, such as De genio 592C1; De sera 563E; 564C; 566 D, simply imply it. See, however, also CH 10.13;17–18,which explicitly mentions the same tripartite view.


In line with the Valentinian etiological myth, anthropology in Plutarch also seems to reflect cosmology. The close correlation between man and cosmos is explicitly stated in De facie:

In the composition of these three factors, earth furnishes the body; the moon the soul; and the sun furnishes mind (to man) for the purpose of his generation even as it furnishes light to the moon herself. As to the death we die, one death reduces man from three factors to two and another reduces him from two to one [De faciae 943A] ...

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τριῶν δὲ τούτων συμπαγέντων τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἡ γῆ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἡ σελήνη τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁ ἥλιος παρέσχεν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ⟨τἀνθρώπῳ⟩ ὥσπερ αὐ⟨τῇ⟩ τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ φέγγος. ὃν δ’ ἀποθνῄσκομεν θάνατον, ὁ μὲν ἐκ τριῶν δύο ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ δ’ ἓν ἐκ δυεῖν

The lowest part of the triad is, for Plutarch, clearly the body, which provides the material substrate for both soul and intellect, and tends to overwhelm them due to its physical nature: the body’s weight, disorderly nature, and needs incline human beings to passions, and this forms the most important obstacle to the human achievement of higher goals, so much so, that De facie even conceives of incarnation both as a “prison” for the soul43 and as punishment for the misbehavior of Spirits. Plutarch conceives of the physical body in such a negative way that he even equates the soul’s incarnation with its death. In this sense, despite a couple of passages adduced to the contrary, Plutarch’s attitude toward the body is, in general, one of contempt.

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Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta (2019) 'The Myth of Human Races: Can Plutarch Help Us Understand Valentinian Anthropology?' in A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic: Essays in Honor of Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, edited by Delfim F. Leão and Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta

From the Conclusion:

2. Both among Valentinians and in Plutarch, anthropology is intrinsically connected to cosmology. The three constitutive parts in the human being in fact reflect the three constitutive elements of the cosmos. While Valentinians distinguish earthly region, the mesotes, and the pleroma, to which they associate the hylics, psychics, and pneumatics, respectively, Plutarch differentiates three regions associated cosmologically with earth, moon, and sun, and anthropologically to body, soul, and intellect. Tripartite anthropology consequently implies tripartite cosmology.

4. ... When distinguishing hylics, psychics, and pneumatics among human beings on the basis of the three human components, Valentinians seem to point rather to inclinations or tendencies in certain human beings. This is also the case in Plutarch: while the philosopher is led by the intellect and always makes the right choice, those who are controlled by their souls, even if originally incapable due to the influence of both body and soul, might in the long run nevertheless achieve the same results by means of determination and ethics. Some might object that character in antiquity was seen as rather stable during human life and not liable to change. This latter view did not preclude, however, the possibility of change, witness the Platonic-Peripatetic motto, to pan ethos dia ethos “character is formed by habit,” along with the wider nature-nurture discussion among philosophical schools. In this line, both Valentinian texts and Plutarch document very well the possibility of migrating from one group to another.

5. This said, it seems clear, however, that both Valentinians and Plutarch grant salvation to the highest element and to those led by it alone, namely pneumatics or philosophers, respectively. Does this mean that Valentinians envisaged an exclusivist or elitarian view of salvation? I don’t think so: both among Valentinians and in Plutarch this view is the corollary to the ontological basis of the myth, since the different human elements cannot be found outside the cosmological regions they belong to. Given that souls cannot enter the pleroma (Valentinians) or reach the sun (Plutarch) and must necessarily remain in the intermediary region, it seems obvious that psychics cannot reach salvation as psychics. In the same manner, according to Plutarch, those who are still dominated by the passionate part of the soul either stay on the moon for purification or are sent back down to earth for reincarnation. Both systems consequently grant salvation to individuals in the middle category, if and only if they manage to transform their nature by means of either pneuma or intellect. Consequently, even if only the highest element can receive salvation, there is no exclusivism, since both systems allow migration among the categories.

The start of the Perseus account of De Facie Quae In Orbe Lunae Apparet : 'Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon':

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/te ... on%3Dintro

[MrMacSon]

... several Christian theologians presented the Christian Trinity as not wholly unique within ancient thought. A tradition going back to the second century sought to underscore the fundamental harmony between Christian and Platonist conceptions of the first principle. In his apologetic Legatio (c. ad 170–180), Athenagoras summarizes Plato’s theological views. He says, with reference to Timaeus 28c, “Here [Plato] understands the unoriginated and eternal (ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον) God to be one”.⁴ When Athenagoras turns to Christian belief, he picks up directly from his characterization of Plato: according to Christians, God is “unoriginated, eternal (ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον), invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, and uncontained, apprehensible by mind and reason alone (νῷ μόνῳ καὶ λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον)” [Leg. 10.1].

⁴ Athenagoras, Leg. 6.2 (12 Schoedel). Athenagoras does not directly ascribe any position on matter to Plato, but, when he summarizes his own Christian position on it, his phrase “unqualified nature” (ἀποίουφύσεως) corresponds to Alcinous, who calls matter ἄποιον: Leg. 10.3 (22 Schoedel); Alcinous, Didaskalikon 8, 162.36 (19 Whittaker).

The epithets echo not only Athenagoras’ own description of Plato, but also contemporary presentations of Platonist doctrine such as Alcinous’ Didaskalikon, likely a rough contemporary to Athenagoras who says the “eternal” (ἀίδιος) God “is ineffable and apprehensible by mind alone” (Ἄρρητος δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ νῷ μόνῳ ληπτός) [Alcinous, Didaskalikon 10, 165.5 (23 Whittaker)].

Athenagoras adds that Christians also believe in a Son of God, though not one like the poets write about in their myths. Rather, the Son is “Word [λόγος: also reason, mind] of the Father in form and in act” (λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ) and the one “from whom and through whom all things come to be” (πρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο) [Leg. 10.2]. He is the “mind and reason (νοῦς καὶ λόγος) of the Father,” who is himself “eternal mind” (νοῦς ἀίδιος); again, this language has parallels in Alcinous. For Athenagoras, the Father’s mind is called Son because he “came forth in order to be form and act (ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια) for all material things” [Leg. 10.3]. The generally Platonizing drift of these terse labels is clear. Athenagoras thinks of the Son in the language of paradigmatic causality.

Around 180, Theophilus of Antioch ascribes two contradictory views to “Plato and those of his school”: first, “that God is unoriginated (ἀγενήτον) and the Father and maker of the universe” and, second, “that matter as well as God is unoriginated (ἀγενήτον)” [Ad Autolycum 2.4]. God cannot be maker of all if there is another unmade principle. In a move that would become customary for Christians, Theophilus sides with the Platonists on the nature of God but against them on matter.¹⁰ While Theophilus does not connect this account of God’s nature with any proto-Trinitarian concerns, the reader cannot miss the partial overlap between Platonist and Christian theology of the first principle, as he presents them.

¹⁰ See Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 1.4 (6 Grant), where Theophilus in his own voice speaks of God as unoriginated (ἀγενήτον), Father, and maker of the universe.

In his Stromateis (c. 200–215), Clement of Alexandria promotes a harmony of the Christian Trinity with Plato’s theology. Note the following passage from Stromateis 5, in which Clement is discussing Timaeus 41a, where Plato calls the demiurge “Father”.<sup>11

11</sup> See Salvatore R. C. Lilla, “The Neoplatonic Hypostases and the Christian Trinity,” in Mark Joyal, ed., Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Essays Presented to John Whittaker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 127–189, at 129.

[Clement] links this text with both the Second Epistle of Plato and the New Testament:

As a result, when [Plato] says “all things are around the king of all, and all things exist for it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things; and second around the secondary things, and third around the tertiary things” (ep. 2, 312e1–4), I for my part cannot understand these words in any other way than as revealing the Holy Trinity: third is the Holy Spirit and the Son is second, “through whom all things came to be” (John 1:3) according to the will of the Father [Strom. V.103.1 (395, 12–17). See also Origen, Against Celsus 6.18 (222–224 Borret)].

... Plotinus uses the same Platonic text to a similar end:

And it is also because of this that we get Plato’s threefold division: the things “around the king of all” – he says this, meaning the primary things – “second around the secondary things,” and “third around the tertiary things.” And he says there is a “Father of the cause,” meaning by “cause” (aition) Intellect. For the Intellect is his Demiurge. And he says that the Demiurge makes the Soul in that “mixing-bowl.” And since the Intellect is cause, he means by “Father” the Good, or that which transcends Intellect and “transcends Substantiality.”14

---

Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, 'The One and the Trinity,' in Christian Platonism, edited by Alexander J. B. Hampton & John Peter Kenney; CUP, 2021: p.53ff

[andrewcriddle]

... several Christian theologians presented the Christian Trinity as not wholly unique within ancient thought. A tradition going back to the second century sought to underscore the fundamental harmony between Christian and Platonist conceptions of the first principle. In his apologetic Legatio (c. ad 170–180), Athenagoras summarizes Plato’s theological views. He says, with reference to Timaeus 28c, “Here [Plato] understands the unoriginated and eternal (ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον) God to be one”.⁴ When Athenagoras turns to Christian belief, he picks up directly from his characterization of Plato: according to Christians, God is “unoriginated, eternal (ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον), invisible, impassible, incomprehensible, and uncontained, apprehensible by mind and reason alone (νῷ μόνῳ καὶ λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον)” [Leg. 10.1].

⁴ Athenagoras, Leg. 6.2 (12 Schoedel). Athenagoras does not directly ascribe any position on matter to Plato, but, when he summarizes his own Christian position on it, his phrase “unqualified nature” (ἀποίουφύσεως) corresponds to Alcinous, who calls matter ἄποιον: Leg. 10.3 (22 Schoedel); Alcinous, Didaskalikon 8, 162.36 (19 Whittaker).

The epithets echo not only Athenagoras’ own description of Plato, but also contemporary presentations of Platonist doctrine such as Alcinous’ Didaskalikon, likely a rough contemporary to Athenagoras who says the “eternal” (ἀίδιος) God “is ineffable and apprehensible by mind alone” (Ἄρρητος δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ νῷ μόνῳ ληπτός) [Alcinous, Didaskalikon 10, 165.5 (23 Whittaker)].

Athenagoras adds that Christians also believe in a Son of God, though not one like the poets write about in their myths. Rather, the Son is “Word [λόγος: also reason, mind] of the Father in form and in act” (λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ) and the one “from whom and through whom all things come to be” (πρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο) [Leg. 10.2]. He is the “mind and reason (νοῦς καὶ λόγος) of the Father,” who is himself “eternal mind” (νοῦς ἀίδιος); again, this language has parallels in Alcinous. For Athenagoras, the Father’s mind is called Son because he “came forth in order to be form and act (ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια) for all material things” [Leg. 10.3]. The generally Platonizing drift of these terse labels is clear. Athenagoras thinks of the Son in the language of paradigmatic causality.

Around 180, Theophilus of Antioch ascribes two contradictory views to “Plato and those of his school”: first, “that God is unoriginated (ἀγενήτον) and the Father and maker of the universe” and, second, “that matter as well as God is unoriginated (ἀγενήτον)” [Ad Autolycum 2.4]. God cannot be maker of all if there is another unmade principle. In a move that would become customary for Christians, Theophilus sides with the Platonists on the nature of God but against them on matter.¹⁰ While Theophilus does not connect this account of God’s nature with any proto-Trinitarian concerns, the reader cannot miss the partial overlap between Platonist and Christian theology of the first principle, as he presents them.

¹⁰ See Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 1.4 (6 Grant), where Theophilus in his own voice speaks of God as unoriginated (ἀγενήτον), Father, and maker of the universe.

In his Stromateis (c. 200–215), Clement of Alexandria promotes a harmony of the Christian Trinity with Plato’s theology. Note the following passage from Stromateis 5, in which Clement is discussing Timaeus 41a, where Plato calls the demiurge “Father”.<sup>11

11</sup> See Salvatore R. C. Lilla, “The Neoplatonic Hypostases and the Christian Trinity,” in Mark Joyal, ed., Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Essays Presented to John Whittaker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 127–189, at 129.

[Clement] links this text with both the Second Epistle of Plato and the New Testament:

As a result, when [Plato] says “all things are around the king of all, and all things exist for it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things; and second around the secondary things, and third around the tertiary things” (ep. 2, 312e1–4), I for my part cannot understand these words in any other way than as revealing the Holy Trinity: third is the Holy Spirit and the Son is second, “through whom all things came to be” (John 1:3) according to the will of the Father [Strom. V.103.1 (395, 12–17). See also Origen, Against Celsus 6.18 (222–224 Borret)].

... Plotinus uses the same Platonic text to a similar end:

And it is also because of this that we get Plato’s threefold division: the things “around the king of all” – he says this, meaning the primary things – “second around the secondary things,” and “third around the tertiary things.” And he says there is a “Father of the cause,” meaning by “cause” (aition) Intellect. For the Intellect is his Demiurge. And he says that the Demiurge makes the Soul in that “mixing-bowl.” And since the Intellect is cause, he means by “Father” the Good, or that which transcends Intellect and “transcends Substantiality.”14

---

Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, 'The One and the Trinity,' in Christian Platonism, edited by Alexander J. B. Hampton & John Peter Kenney; CUP, 2021: p.53ff

This sort of Platonic Trinity, (there are probably other versions), tends to end up being hierarchical with the three persons of the Trinity being unequal. The sort of model of God we find in Arius. The Trinity in later orthodoxy is rather different although it probably does have links to triads in Neoplatonism.

Andrew Criddle