Jennifer Otto (2018) Philo of Alexandria and the Construction of Jewishness in Early Christian Writings, OUP, pp.11-13 (Introduction):
Who is a Jew? Philo’s Distinction Between Ioudaioi and Israel
... As Ellen Birnbaum has shown, the definition of Jewishness operative in Philo’s own thought is not as straightforward as modern readers might expect. In The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews and Proselytes, Birnbaum observes that Philo does not use the terms Israel (Israel) and Ioudaioi (Jews) interchangeably. Via word studies and a close reading of Philo’s treatises, she demonstrates that the two terms do not usually occur in the same treatise. Moreover, Philo employs the word Israel most frequently in the treatises that comprise his Allegorical Commentary, which Birnbaum contends was written with an elite, highly educated segment of the Jewish audience in mind. In these treatises, Philo interprets Israel according to its Hebrew etymology, which he then translates into Greek as horōn theon, “seeing God”.37 From this interpretation, he understands biblical references to Israel to designate individuals who possess an elite spiritual or mystical capability to experience a vision of God. This capability may be inborn or attained through philosophical study and practice. On the other hand, Philo writes of Ioudaioi in his Exposition of the Law, writings that Birnbaum suggests were intended for a more general Jewish readership. In these treatises, Ioudaioi are praised as the discrete social group that follows the laws of Moses and thus alone properly worships the one true God.
Theoretically, Philo opens both designations to individuals who were not born into the Jewish people. The “membership requirements” for the two groups, however, differ. Proselytes, Birnbaum claims, seek to become Jews, not members of Israel. She observes, “Philo mentions that proselytes leave behind mythical inventions, polytheistic beliefs, ancestral customs, family, friends, and country and come over to the one true God, truth, piety, virtue, the laws, and a new polity”.38 In contrast, “because the distinguishing mark of ‘Israel’ is its ability to see God, it would seem that anyone who qualifies—whether Jew or non-Jew—may be considered part of ‘Israel.’” Birnbaum continues, “Philo speaks quite admiringly of non-Jews like the Persian Magi and other unnamed sages from Greek and foreign lands. Although he never calls these people ‘Israel’ or speaks of them as seeing God per se, his description of them would lead one to think that they meet the requirements for belonging.”
According to Birnbaum’s reading, Philo has no concept of “Israel according to the flesh”; membership in Israel is determined purely by spiritual capability. Jews as a people therefore have no inherent claim to the title Israel. She contends,
Philo himself does not explicitly draw a connection between the vision of God and Jewish worship of Him. We may speculate that seeing God may lead one to worship Him in the Jewish way and worshipping God in the Jewish way may lead one to be able to see Him. Despite these possibilities, however, Jewish worship of God and the vision of Him are not necessarily connected. We therefore cannot determine precisely the relationship between those who see God—“Israel”—and those who worship Him in the Jewish way—the Jews. Although these two entities may overlap or be one and the same, the exact connection between them remains unclear.39
Birnbaum interprets Philo as effectively associating Israel with the ontologically superior spiritual realm and the Jews with the lower, corporeal realm, maintaining that there is no necessary connection between the two.
Although some have questioned whether the distinction between the categories of “Israel” and “Jew” in Philo’s thought are as rigid as Birnbaum suggests,40 Philo’s conceptual separation of the title “Israel” from Jewishness, and his subsequent association of that title with a mystical encounter with the divine, opens up possibilities for its appropriation by readers of the Hebrew scriptures who reject their halakhic and liturgical demands. Philo’s distinction between Israel (those who mystically “see” God) and the Jews (the people who worship God properly according to the law of Moses) held significant appeal for Clement, Origen, and Eusebius. In the chapters that follow, we shall see how this semantic distinction, rooted in Philo’s writings, continues to reverberate in the definitions that each early Christian author constructs for the terms Israel, Hebraios, and Ioudaios.41
(37) Philo, De Mutatione Nominum (On the Change of Names). 81.
(38) Ellen Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes. Brown Judaic Studies (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 196.
(39) Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism, 212.
(40) See Maren Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 95 n. 84: “Such a radical distinction between Jews and Israel, however, is unwarranted. Statements such as ‘the suppliants’ race which the Father and King of the Universe and the source of all things has taken for his portion…is called in the Hebrew tongue Israel, but, expressed in our tongue, the word is “he that sees God”’ (Leg. 3–4) demonstrate the intrinsic connection between Jews and Israel.”
(41) In a broader study that also takes Philo into account, Graham Harvey considers the semantic ranges of the terms Jew, Hebrew, and Israel in Jewish writings from the Second Temple period and contends that similar differentiations were adopted by Christians. See Harvey, The True Israel: The Use of the Terms Jew, Hebrew, and Israel in Ancient Jewish and Early Christian Texts (Leiden: Brill, 1996).