Biblical Criticism & History Forum - earlywritings.com

A re-evaluation:

https://www.academia.edu/6136236/_Euseb ... _p_119_150

He sees it as more general, with a heavy reliance (if anything) on Origen against Celsus. He questions the attempt to find fragments of Porphyry therein.

He writes that it is possible:



Question: why isn't Eusebius answering to a mythicist accusation by Porphyry when he interpolated the Testimonium in Josephus?

The phrase:


...seems to address mythicists who reduce Jedus to a mere spirit. It is anticipating of many centuries the usual modern historicist objection "yes, Jesus was mythologized but..."

Giuseppe wrote: ↑Sun Sep 29, 2024 3:15 am The phrase:

if indeed one ought to call him a man

Usually interpreted with reference to divinity, "a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man, for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure," etc.

A "wise man" acknowledges humanity already but doesn't seem polemical in that sense, but maybe as a refutation of Jesus as GOHS instead.

Olson writes:

It is not clear to me the importance, in the Ken Olson's article, of the reference to Hierocles and Apollonius, i.e. how much it is required in relation to the general thesis and argument.

I have heard an argument (I don't know if by Eisler or Thackeray, I go to memory) about the phrase "if indeed one ought to call him a man" having a parallel in the Slavonicus, where it is used surely against people who deny the humanity of Jesus and consider him only an angel (not a GOHS):


My point is not that the Slavonic is genuine. My point is that, if that phrase "if indeed one ought to call him a man" found an expansion in the quote above from the Slavonic (as Ken Olson himself seems to concede willingly), then the natural reading of that phrase "if indeed one ought to call him a man" excludes a priori an objection à la Apollonius ("not a GOHS but a wise man") and assumes as default position the mythicist and/or docetical objection ("not an angel but a man"), pace Olson.

Giuseppe wrote: ↑Sun Sep 29, 2024 3:46 am My point is not that the Slavonic is genuine. My point is that, if that phrase "if indeed one ought to call him a man" found an expansion in the quote above from the Slavonic (as Ken Olson himself seems to concede willingly), then the natural reading of that phrase "if indeed one ought to call him a man" excludes a priori an objection à la Apollonius ("not a GOHS but a wise man") and assumes as default position the mythicist and/or docetical objection ("not an angel but a man"), pace Olson.

I don't follow, the Slavonic is later.

The forger of the (entire) Slavonic TF expanded the phrase found by him in the Greek TF, i.e.

"if indeed one ought to call him a man"

...in a way that makes it beyond any doubt an apology against proponents of the only-divine(angelic) character of Jesus.

By doing so, was the (Slavonic) forger a person who interpreted the original sense of the Greek expression

"if indeed one ought to call him a man"

...better than Ken Olson, who interprets it as an apology against Hierocles's accusation that Jesus was a GOHS in virtue of the his miracles etc ?

Is your answer yes or not?

Giuseppe wrote: ↑Sun Sep 29, 2024 6:48 am forger a person who interpreted the original sense of the Greek expression ... better

Weird assumption but ok, you do you.

When Ken Olson writes:


(my bold)

...I find very much unexpected (= improbable) that the same identical Greek phrase (that is crucial for the Olson's argument) is expanded by the Slavonic forger in a way that leaves none doubt about its apologetical character against deniers of the humanity of Jesus.

In addition, if one accepts the result of the new study about Eusebius's ignorance of what were really the real Porphyry's arguments against the Christianity, then it is not even sure that Porphyry raised the accusation that Jesus was a mere man and not divine.

Sébastien Morlet's paper, "Eusebius’ Polemic Against Porphyry: A Reassessment," offers a meticulous examination of Eusebius of Caesarea's engagement with Porphyry’s criticisms against Christianity. The central claim is that scholars have exaggerated Eusebius' polemic against Porphyry, often misinterpreting the extent and nature of his responses.

Morlet's argument challenges the long-held assumption that Eusebius' works, Praeparatio Evangelica and Demonstratio Evangelica, were direct rebuttals to Porphyry's Contra Christianos. Instead, Morlet suggests that while Eusebius may have addressed Porphyry's accusations, he primarily drew from a broader apologetic tradition, frequently responding to earlier critics like Celsus.

A noteworthy point in Morlet's analysis is how the reliance on the assumption that Harnack’s fragments indicated a pervasive anti-Porphyrian intent has led to an overestimation of Porphyry's influence on Eusebius' writings. Morlet highlights that Eusebius often quoted Porphyry not as an adversary but as an auxiliary witness to demonstrate contradictions within pagan thought. Morlet also illustrates that much of Eusebius' arguments are rooted in earlier Christian responses, especially those of Origen against Celsus.

In critiquing this paper, one must acknowledge its impressive command over the sources and scholarly discourse. However, there is a tendency to downplay the possibility that Eusebius engaged in a more implicit and indirect dialogue with Porphyry than Morlet admits. Just as Morlet argues against reading Eusebius through Augustine's concerns, one must also avoid a binary interpretation that restricts Eusebius' intellectual engagement to explicit, named adversaries. The subtle nuances of Eusebius’ rhetoric might well conceal a broader anti-Porphyrian agenda, even if not always directly stated. Morlet’s paper is a refreshing, if at times overly cautious, contribution to the debate, pushing us to reconsider the complexity of Eusebius' apologetics in their historical context.

I think Eusebius rewrote Origen's original text against Celsus.