My review of Richard Carrier's "On the Historicity of Jesus"

[Giuseppe]

That is along the lines of GA Wells' theory.

I would disagree. What I has in mind is not GA Wells' theory (who has the limit of adding the entirely ad hoc hypothesis of 'ancestral remote times' for the Jesus of Paul) but the Roger Parvus theory (in all similar to Carrier/Doherty, with the only difference that his mythical Jesus died on the Earth).
As Andrew rightly recognizes my point, he means as possibility B distinct from C (Carrier) the idea that Jesus lived an ENTIRE life on the Earth (complete of predication, exorcism, at all) and was mythical.
In that sense Andrew is right: his B is in no way reducible to C.
While the possibility B as meant by Parvus (Jesus dies on this Earth but only for a few hours) is very reducible to C.

[maryhelena]

Wells' theory is that Paul believed in a historical Jesus, but one that died a century or more before Paul wrote.

By highlighting the century mark, you are leaning heavily into Alvar Ellegård, I believe. Wells himself — at least in his early, classic stuff (the stuff that influenced me in college) — did not press exactly how long before Paul the figure of Jesus was imagined to have lived: all that mattered was that it was not in recent, contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous history. Peter Kirby summarizes his view accurately, I think: "Paul, for instance, wrote before any gospel existed, and his Jesus lived on earth as a shadowy figure of the indefinite past."

Thanks Ben. Yes, you are right. I do remember reading that Wells placed Paul's Jesus a couple of centuries before, but on googling this Wells doesn't say this that I can find. I suspect I got it from Doherty's review of Ellegard, where Doherty writes: http://www.jesuspuzzle.humanists.net/BkrvEll.htm

• Professor Wells has always maintained that this is the way Paul regarded his Christ Jesus, as a heavenly, pre-existent figure who had come to earth at some uncertain point in the past and lived an obscure life, perhaps one or two centuries before his own time.

But even here the emphasis is on an uncertain point in the past.

George Wells: Cutting Jesus Down to Size (2013)

I have since 1996 accepted that the
biography as not all pure invention, but based to some
extent on the life history of the itinerant Galilean preacher
who figures in Q.

(= Quelle, German for ‘source’). It bears
witness to Jesus as a Galilean preacher of the early first
century who urged Jews to repent before an imminent and
final judgment would overtake them. Q only implicitly takes
some note of his death, as on a par with the hostility and
violence suffered by prophets down the ages. It certainly
does not regard his death as redemptive, and has no Passion
narrative, nor mention of Pilate. It consists mainly of Jesus’s
sayings, and is in this respect similar to the Coptic Gospel of
Thomas, discovered in 1945

Paul may well have thought of his “Christ crucified” as one of the
victims of earlier rulers of the region. Josephus tells that
Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria in the second century
B.C., and the Hasmonean ruler Alexander Jannaeus, of the
first century B.C., both caused living Jews to be crucified in
Jerusalem (Antiquities of the Jews, 12:255–56; 13:380)

When I first addressed these problems, more than thirty
years ago, it seemed to me that, because the earliest Christian
references to Jesus are so vague, the gospel Jesus could be
no more than a mythical expansion and elaboration of this
obscure figure. But from the mid-1990s I became persuaded
that many of the gospel traditions are too specific in their
references to time, place, and circumstances to have
developed in such a short time from no other basis, and are
better understood as traceable to the activity of a Galilean
preacher of the early first century, the personage represented
in Q (the inferred non-Markan source, not extant, common to
Matthew and Luke; cf. above, p. 2), which may be even
earlier than the Paulines. This is the position I have argued in
my books of 1996, 1999, and 2004, although the titles of the
first two of these—The Jesus Legend and The Jesus Myth—
may mislead potential readers into supposing that I still
denied the historicity of the gospel Jesus.4 These titles were
chosen because I regarded (and still do regard) the virgin
birth, much in the Galilean ministry, the crucifixion around
A.D. 30 under Pilate, and the resurrection as legendary. What
we have in the gospels is surely a fusion of two originally
quite independent streams of tradition, namely, as Bultmann a
good while ago intimated, “the union of the Hellenistic
kerygma about Christ whose essential content consists of the
Christ-myth as we learn it from Paul, . . . with the tradition of
the story of Jesus” (1963, p. 347). The Galilean preacher of
the early first century who had met with rejection, and the
supernatural personage of the early epistles, who sojourned
briefly on Earth and then, rejected, returned to heaven, have
been condensed into one. The preacher has been given a
salvific death and resurrection, and these have been set not in
an unspecified past (as in the early epistles) but in a
historical context consonant with the Galilean preaching. The
fusion of the two figures will have been facilitated by the fact
that both owe quite a lot of their substance in the documents
to ideas very important in the Jewish Wisdom literature. I
have dealt with this in the books of 1996, 1999, and 2004,
and I revert to it in Chapter 6 below.
I regard it as of the utmost importance to keep in mind
that, prior to their fusion in the gospels, the two streams of
tradition were quite separate and independent of each other.

So, basically, Wells has a crucified figure in the distant past - even a historical crucified figure under the Hasmonean Alexander Jannaeus - and a Galilean preacher living in the early first century. For Wells, elements of two historical figures, one crucified and one not crucified, were fused into the gospel figure of Jesus.

Both Doherty and Carrier have stepped away from Wells. However, like Wells himself, Doherty and Carrier need to backtrack. They need to acknowledge that there are historical reflections within the gospel story. What those historical reflections relate to is up for discussion - but that they are there has to be part of any ahistoricist/mythicist argument against the Jesus historicists. The Carrier mythicists have to meet the historicists on their ground - gospel ground. A historical claim cannot be trumped by appeals to Pauline theological interpretations. Historical claims have to be rejected on historical grounds not theological speculation.

Yes, there is no historical evidence for the claim of the Jesus historicists. However, the real question relates to what in history motivated the gospel writers to write their story. The historicist's claim is a dead end - no evidence. Therefore the question becomes - what was it in Hasmonean/Jewish history, during Roman occupation, that was relevant to the writers of the gospel story?

[timhendrix]

Yes friends, I was one of those three Amazon reviewers who timhendrix quoted as praising Dr Carrier's use of Bayes' Theorem.
No such thing as bad publicity, right ?

Small world! Not sure what you mean about bad publicity, did I take you out of context? Just for the record I only used the quotes to highlight that the use of Bayes theorem is by some seen as an important feature of OHJ.

[Ulan]

Small world! Not sure what you mean about bad publicity, did I take you out of context? Just for the record I only used the quotes to highlight that the use of Bayes theorem is by some seen as an important feature of OHJ.

Oh, it's certainly an important feature of OHJ. Math intimidates most people, and it may scare some detractors away who don't want to look stupid.

[Kapyong]

Gday timhendrix,

Thanks for your reply.

Small world! Not sure what you mean about bad publicity, did I take you out of context? Just for the record I only used the quotes to highlight that the use of Bayes theorem is by some seen as an important feature of OHJ.

No mate, it's all good
I did indeed praise Dr Carrier's use of BT and probability - in contrast to ad hoc arguments or mere possibilities.
(I was just having a little joke about being cited as a lowly Amazon reviewer, not as a scholar.)

I think OHJ was a superb work, and a significant step forwards for JM studies. I see it has sparked a lot of discussion, and attracted a lot of criticism. But to be honest, you are probably far better suited to judge his use of BT than I am.


Kapyong

[Speusippus]

Tim, your summary post from April 26th is greatly appreciated. I've not really been able to follow a lot of the technical objections people have brought to bear on Carrier's use of BT. Your summary post really helps with that, at least when it comes to the objections you're making.

I will need to read it again more closely before I can say anything more substantive.

But I am wondering what you think about this: Does Carrier's argument strike you as one that has been _poorly formalized_ using BT but nevertheless has (or might have) some plausibility in itself? When I read his book, I kind of skipped over the math, figuring it's really just a formalization of what seems to me to be a pretty intuitive process, that of following through on thoughts of the form: "If I am shown good reasons to think X is surprising assuming Y is true, then I should adjust my confidence in Y accordingly."

I take the book to be providing a lot of new considerations that various X's are surprising assuming historicity is true, and hence arguing that we should adjust our confidence in historicity accordingly. (Also that various things are less surprising than we might have realized assuming mythicism is true.)

When I try to talk about this purely in terms of "confidence levels" like I just did, I run into discussions I don't understand about frequentism and Bayesianism. It's not so much that I don't understand what those are--I basically do, or anyway, always am able to catch myself up on it when it comes up--but rather, I don't understand _why that dispute matters._

I know Carrier says he's a frequentist, and I know there's some problem about whether his stuff can be justified on frequentist grounds. Something something frequentist vs Bayesian something something. But despite what Carrier says, I keep finding him actually talking, not like a frequentist, but like someone who interprets probabilities simply as levels of rational credence. That's, meanwhile, how _I_ tend to think of probabilities. And I don't quite understand why the question of whether rational credences should be based more on frequencies or on bayesian somethingerothers should really affect whether we can use the theorem--provable from the K axioms after all--to decide how confident we should be in certain propositions giving other propositions. I don't really understand how the problems carrier runs into w.r.t. frequentism (whatever those problems are exactly!) should have any significance for that.

I suppose I'm saying I think of this as kind of a "shut up and calculate" kind of thing, and I am not really sure why the frequentism stuff keeps coming up, or why anyone thinks it's important to the validity of his arguments.

I don't know, that was pretty scattered, but I'm just wondering, do you have any thoughts on this?

[timhendrix]

Hi Speusippus, just ask if there is anything you want to have clarified.

But I am wondering what you think about this: Does Carrier's argument strike you as one that has been _poorly formalized_ using BT but nevertheless has (or might have) some plausibility in itself?

I am asking myself that question! The truth is that I am not even a well-read amateur on history, so I am really the worst person to evaluate the historical case. I know Neil (on Vridar) is working on a review and I am sure there must be threads on this forum that discuss Carriers hypothesis. I hope to have time to read these reviews later:
http://www.raphaellataster.com/Articles ... r,OHOJ.htm
https://www.reddit.com/r/AcademicBiblic ... e_read_to/?
http://www.strangenotions.com/an-atheis ... rt-1-of-2/

But since you ask: I do think that many of the points Carrier brings up are interesting and relevant. I think it shows how fluid the evidence can be when one factor in different interpretations and the possibility of interpolation. Sometimes, I think Carrier is a to optimistic when it comes to interpreting the evidence, for instance when discussing Paul where I think the most natural reading would be that Paul is talking about a human.
If I can bring up one point of the review which I would most like a historians opinion on it is that Carriers hypothesis would imply that at around the time of Paul (ca. 55CE?) Jesus is thought to have been a celestial being who lived and died in the supernatural realm and than a few decades later we have the Gospels where Jesus is clearly on earth and (presumably?) this is believed by many Christians. I think it would be very interesting to search for similar historical cases to evaluate how plausible this type of scenario is, especially considering how rapid the transition was and how little evidence it left behind.

When I try to talk about this purely in terms of "confidence levels" like I just did, I run into discussions I don't understand about frequentism and Bayesianism. It's not so much that I don't understand what those are--I basically do, or anyway, always am able to catch myself up on it when it comes up--but rather, I don't understand _why that dispute matters._

I don't think it should matter at all and this is one of the most frustrating aspects of the discussion. Just to fix the terminology, "Baysianism" is essentially a set of assumptions which implies that we are allowed to talk about the probability of one-off events like "Does Jesus exist" and then if we do, these probabilities will obey the rules of probability theory (the sum and product rule). There is nothing more to it. You don't get anything "more" than the rules of probability by "being Baysian".

Frequentism is another interpretation of probability theory where probabilities are thought to be either finite frequencies, i.e. (#times an event happened)/(#trials), or a limit of such frequencies. Assigning probabilities to one-off events with that type of interpretation is much more problematic. But that's an aside: If we agree we can talk about the probability of such an event we just end up with the rules of probability theory no matter what.

And I don't quite understand why the question of whether rational credences should be based more on frequencies or on bayesian somethingerothers should really affect whether we can use the theorem--provable from the K axioms after all--to decide how confident we should be in certain propositions giving other propositions.

The only snag is that if you use a frequency-based interpretation, a philosopher will have a field day asking you questions like "the frequency of what?" with regards to the probability of Jesus existence. Asides that, you are absolutely right: Just start with the Kolmogorov axioms and go from there.

I suppose I'm saying I think of this as kind of a "shut up and calculate" kind of thing, and I am not really sure why the frequentism stuff keeps coming up, or why anyone thinks it's important to the validity of his arguments.

Here is where it becomes complicated. Carrier believes that he has invented a new interpretation of probability theory which is neither Baysian (i.e. degree-of-belief or degree-of-rational-credence based) or frequentistic in the ordinary sense. The interpretation is based on a frequentistic concept. From PH:

"When Bayesians talk about probability as a degree of certainty that h is true, they are just talking about the frequency of a different thing than days of rain or number of smokers. They are talking about the frequency with which beliefs of a given type are true"

Long story short, I think the definition suffers from well-known problems and Carrier disagrees. Obviously this does not answer why we should care: as a discussion on the philosophy of probability that might be interesting, but it should not bother us as long as we agree that we will subscribe to the rules of probability because the rules of probability are what they are and we can just "shut up and calculate"?

The problem here is that in other discussions with Carrier he has referred to (or at the very least hinted at) certain rules that prohibit or allows an operation which I don't think can be justified from any foundation of probability theory I am aware of. For instance, when I discussed his fine-tuning argument, Carrier invoked a rule that certain pieces of information must be treated as "background information" (thereby implying they are not subject to the product rule), see for instance section 5.2 here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/296697791/Ri ... g-argument

A similar type of intuition also underlies some of Zbykows responses this Vridar thread. The annotated version:

"Zbykow: You also seem to have problems[which?] with the concept of background knowledge[how does this concept differ from other propositions?] for some strange reason. If you understood what it is[what is it?] and where it kicks in[when does it kick in?], you’d know[what book should I read to know this?] it’s not subject to calculations like yours.[according to what rule, formula or law?]"

http://vridar.org/2016/04/15/what-does- ... /#comments

I think what Carrier or Zbykow is getting at is that I am violating something which is true on Carriers account of probabilities. I also think that if Carrier believes all probabilities are frequencies then it is more natural to make frequentistic approximations (like the RR hero class) but I am not sure.. everything is very vague and whenever Carrier says that someone don't know how probabilities work or that you can't do this or that he never says how probabilities do work and what rules (i.e. textbook rules) I or other who are accused of this are actually violating. It also appears impossible to get a straight answer to these questions.

tl;dr: The bottom line is that I would be *really* glad if the discussion of philosophy of probability was kept isolated from the application of probabilities because to me it is irrelevant, and it would be really good for the discussion if accusations of "violating" a rule of probability would be followed up with the exact rule which was violated.

[gmx]

Apparently there is a 1 in 12,000 chance that the figure described in the NT, one Jesus of Nazareth, is a historical figure. I'm not a mathematician, I don't understand Bayes Theorem, and I haven't read anything Richard Carrier has written. My "to read list" is long and doesn't include anything by him. Oh, to have that much time! Carrier might be right about the 1:12000, but I doubt his methodology (or his application of it) proves the case. For the record, I doubt it on the grounds that if it was other than I described, it would have generated a groundswell (even a small one) of support among the fraternity of conservative scholarship. To me, Carrier's idea is just another dot somewhere along the broad spectrum of possible methods and solutions permitted within the fluid boundaries established by the evidence of early Christianity. Christian Origins is the academic equivalent of "every child wins a prize".

Someone more intellectually gifted than myself might even be able to frame it in Bayesian terms -- what is the likelihood, given the enormity of human cognitive effort applied to the problem over 200 years, that Richard Carrier has hit upon the correct method, and applied it successfully, in accurately determining the likelihood of the historical existence of the NT personage of Jesus?

Any takers?

[outhouse]

Apparently there is a 1 in 12,000 chance that the figure described in the NT, one Jesus of Nazareth, is a historical figure.


Any takers?

Only if someone perverts context of the evidence and or the math theorem itself.


Reality is the current state of historicity is so strong its like 12,000 to 1 he has historicity at the core level.


Math does not work here. NOW I would agree the NT Jesus is mythological in nature the way it was written by people far removed from any actual event, and biblical jesus never existed. But IMHO a Galilean was martyred after crucifixion that generated the mythology.

-- what is the likelihood, given the enormity of human cognitive effort applied to the problem over 200 years, that Richard Carrier has hit upon the correct method, and applied it successfully, in accurately determining the likelihood of the historical existence of the NT personage of Jesus?

None what so ever. His book was an utter failure and it never gained any traction.

He cannot even address Pauline studies in context let alone take on the big question here. I will give him credit for giving a replacement hypothesis no matter how poor it actually was, because he tried where many wont stake their reputation.

[timhendrix]

Reality is the current state of historicity is so strong its like 12,000 to 1 he has historicity at the core level.

If you have read OHJ and feel the Bayesian approach has any merits to it at all, I wonder which of the probabilities Carrier assigns to the historical evidence you feel most strongly should be changed?