Probability about Jesus (Christ) existence on earth

[Bernard Muller]

to Peter,

Peter Kirby wrote:

It's entirely possible to make the kind of argument that you want to make, while trying to take into account conditional probability.

In fact, it's the only mathematically valid way to do so... (and assuming independence is not the only way to do so...)

Thanks, Peter.
But I am asking: what conditional probability regarding my 9 points? Why dependence on these nine points should be assumed?
Where is the evidence in favor of any conditional probabilities or against independence?

And you can use the conditional probability version of the formula at the top of the thread:

P(A or C or D) = 1 - (1 - P(A)) (1 - P(C | ~A)) (1 - P(D | ~A and ~C)) = 1 - (0.5) (0.8) (0.75) = 1 - 0.3 = 0.7

Are you saying that after you made all these calculations (ref viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2753&start=20#p61298, the probability that Bob did the crime, is 70 % rather than 87.5 %, as I proposed?

From viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2753&start=20#p61298

If this is the set of outcomes that define the probability space, then P(A or C or D) = 1.

Or, for example, this set of outcomes is also consistent with P(A) = P(C) = P(D) = 0.5.

Outcome (A, C, D) - probability 0.5
Outcome (~A, ~C, ~D) - probability 0.5

Sorry, but for me P(A or C or D) = 0.875 (at least one of the three saw Bob doing the crime)
And then:
Outcome (A, C, D) - probability 0.125 (all of the three saw Bob doing the crime)
Outcome (~A, ~C, ~D) - probability 0.125 (none of the three saw Bob doing the crime)
About only two of the three seeing Bob doing the crime: probability 0.375

If the six cases implying the past existence of an earthly human Jesus in the Pauline epistles have a 50% chance to be true, then the overall probability is 98.44% to be true. And I think the low value (50%) should take care of any factor (which would lower the probability from 100%, this base value being according to the natural reading for each six pieces of evidence). If it is not enough, you need to prove it.
And there are more, such as "poor, in poverty" (2 Cor 8:9) (can anyone be poor in heaven?), "the one man Jesus Christ" (Ro 5:15) (also in 1 Co 15:47), and the crucifixion happening in the heartland of the Jews http://historical-jesus.info/19.html (1 Co)

But the big incongruity here are those two things in the middle. Is it really so likely that Paul sometimes has a non-mythicist interpretation and other times has a mythicist interpretation?

I do not see in any of the 6 cases any evidence that Paul had a mythicist interpretation in mind. A normal reading of these cases tells Paul was stating a past earthly human Jesus. And in all cases, the interpretations of Mythicists are far-fetched (yes I like that word), complicated and ill-evidenced.

Indeed, extending the same to more passages, it becomes 'extremely unlikely' that any 'pure' position on Paul is correct. But that is far from intuitive. The most likely scenarios should be 'historicist' with or without a couple interpolations, 'mythicist' with or without a couple interpolations (by 'interpretation'), and 'mythicist' by interpolations (at least, that is my intuition, in general).

This would involve a lot of 'correlated data' so to speak. If one passage has the weird interpretation, likely more do. If several passages are interpolated, likely more are.

But it would have been nice if this was all understood, at least, in the abstract. If you don't get it in the abstract, why should we discuss (using probability) the highly controversial topics that will be highly difficult for people to agree on in the first place? So yes I ask again that the math is studied a bit more seriously before it is pressed into service for (dubious) applications.

There is a lot of speculations here. I do not see what is weird in my six cases even if Paul hardly never used straight forward wording.

Cordially, Bernard

[Bernard Muller]

to Ben,
Let's say a man said something which is implying with a 50% probability objectification of women (the remaining 50% would be NOT implying objectification of women).
Then he said something else which is implying with a 50% probability objectification of women.
Then again, for a third time, he said something else which is implying with a 50% probability objectification of women.

I say, according to these three sayings of that man, he said things which, together, are implying with a 87.5% probability (1-[0.5^3]) objectification of women.

Cordially, Bernard

[Peter Kirby]

Here is an example that I would use, to illustrate the concept once again. (This is not a "generalized example," shorn of any irrelevant details, that will mean that you will now understand everything about it. It is a particular example. It is your responsibility to try to understand other instances in which the general concept can apply.)

Suppose you had a confirmation of someone's ID based on voice recognition. The same person confirmed their ID by voice recognition at 1 pm, 2 pm, and 3 pm. Unfortunately there is no other data on this person.

There is a 20% chance of the voice recognition ID technique providing a false positive (not the person, but gives a match). There is an 80% chance that a different person will provide a non-match.

In this example, do you still not see the concept illustrated regarding independent probabilities? (After three of these tests, what is the probability of a false positive, overall? Do you think this is going to use an assumption of independent probabilities?)

If not, you need to read more about it.

In any case, I think you need to read more about it...

[Bernard Muller]

to Peter,

Suppose you had a confirmation of someone's ID based on voice recognition. The same person confirmed their [did you mean "his"] ID by voice recognition at 1 pm, 2 pm, and 3 pm. Unfortunately there is no other data on this person.

There is a 20% chance of the voice recognition ID technique providing a false positive (not the person, but gives a match). There is an 80% chance that a different person will provide a non-match.

Frankly, Peter, I do not know what your example has to do with the one I gave to Ben.
Is there anything wrong with my example? If so, what is it? Can you modify my example with the features of your own?
About your example, I think you are driving towards a Bayes theorem for the solution.

Cordially, Bernard

[Peter Kirby]

to Peter,

Suppose you had a confirmation of someone's ID based on voice recognition. The same person confirmed their [did you mean "his"] ID by voice recognition at 1 pm, 2 pm, and 3 pm. Unfortunately there is no other data on this person.

There is a 20% chance of the voice recognition ID technique providing a false positive (not the person, but gives a match). There is an 80% chance that a different person will provide a non-match.

Frankly, Peter, I do not know what your example has to do with the one I gave to Ben.

Nothing, necessarily. So far you don't seem to get the concept, so I supplied something that might help.

Is there anything wrong with my example?

Even if it were a nice example of independence, it wouldn't mean that all events/examples illustrate independence. (Basically, you don't need to provide "examples"; we know there are some situations in which events have independent probability.)

If so, what is it? Can you modify my example with the features of your own?

Sure. If one of the competing scenarios/outcomes with nonzero probability is that "the statements were part of a satirical piece/bit," or "the statements were invented by a hostile source," then ... put 2 + 2 together.

About your example, I think you are driving towards a Bayes theorem for the solution.

No. There's no solution intended. It's an illustration of a real world situation in which you should not assume independence of probabilities. A solution would require additional information (regarding conditional probabilities).

E.g., maybe there is only a 20% chance that someone with a different identity gets a match, but, once matched with their own voice or recorded voice, there is a 90% chance that they will get an additional match.

PS - Now that you say so, it might be used for the final answer, with additional information - good idea. But it's not the point.

[neilgodfrey]

Let's say we give 50% probability that the following shows that Jesus called Christ existed as a man on earth:
1) Descendant of Abraham (Gal 3:16)
2) Descendant of Israelites (Ro 9:4-5)
3) Descendant of Jesse (Ro 15:12)
4) Descendant of David (Ro 1:3)
5) Having brothers by blood, one of them being James (1 Cor 9:5, Gal 1:19)
6) becoming from a woman (Gal 4:4)
7) From the tribe of Judah (Heb 7:14)
8) Tacitus' Annals 15.44
9) Josephus' Antiquities XX, IX, 1

The probability being lowered to 50% would be in consideration that:
1) The epistle verses in question might be part of interpolations and (or the whole epistle) written after one or several gospels were "published".
2) Mythicists (or others) arguing (far-fetched) interpretations showing otherwise (that is not showing the past existence on earth of a man Jesus called Christ)

Let's say we give 50% probability that the following shows that Jesus Christ was resurrected from the dead:
1) Empty tomb (Mk 16)
2) Paul saw him after resurrection (1Cor15)
3) Peter saw him after resurrection (John)
4) John saw him after resurrection
5) 500 saw him after resurrection . . . .
6) Josephus says disciples claimed to see him after resurrection.....

[Bernard Muller]

to Peter,

Sure. If one of the competing scenarios/outcomes with nonzero probability is that "the statements were part of a satirical piece/bit," or "the statements were invented by a hostile source," then ... put 2 + 2 together.

Well, I think these kinds of scenarios/outcomes, if there are somewhat justified by some evidence, would likely fit within my other 50% probability (NOT implying objectification of women), as long as their probability to be true is low. Of course, if we had a lot of evidence for these scenarios/outcomes, then the resulting greater probability for them to be true may lower some or all of these probabilities (implying objectification of women) to lower than 50%.

Cordially, Bernard

[Peter Kirby]

to Peter,

Sure. If one of the competing scenarios/outcomes with nonzero probability is that "the statements were part of a satirical piece/bit," or "the statements were invented by a hostile source," then ... put 2 + 2 together.

Well, I think these kinds of scenarios/outcomes, if there are somewhat justified by some evidence, would likely fit within my other 50% probability (NOT implying objectification of women), as long as their probability to be true is low. Of course, if we had a lot of evidence for these scenarios/outcomes, then the resulting greater probability for them to be true may lower some or all of these probabilities (implying objectification of women) to lower than 50%.

Cordially, Bernard

Don't lose the forest for the trees. You need to understand how to work with probability in the absence of independence. Please learn about it.

[Peter Kirby]

(And, no, you're still not understanding. The probabilities are not "lowered" - you miss the point entirely, and that idea contradicts our assumptions regarding the scenario. We've already found the individual, unconditioned probabilities based on whatever information is available to lead us to such things. So they've been "lowered" or "raised" or whatever already.)

(The question is how to use these individual probabilities to compute something else, such as the probability that at least one of the events happened. That's impossible without knowing the conditional probabilities. If the conditional probability is different from the unconditioned probability, as it can be, then we need to think about that too. We need those conditional probabilities.)

[Bernard Muller]

to Peter,

You need to understand how to work with probability in the absence of independence. Please learn about it.

Why don't you go back to my initial claim with my nine points and substitute to it your own set of calculations with your own values about probabilities (including the conditional ones)?

Cordially, Bernard