Ken Olson wrote: ↑Fri Mar 23, 2018 9:45 am
Ben
How do you understand these two verses from James?
1.25 But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act—they will be blessed in their doing.
2.12 So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty.
Is the perfect (or completed) law, the law of liberty (a seeming oxymoron), different from the law given by Moses? If so, when was the law perfected and what is the law of liberty? On my reading, it would seem that the law has now been completed or perfected as the law of liberty, and, under the law of liberty, people are free from something by which they would otherwise have been bound.
I find nothing necessarily wrong with your reading, but I do not think it is the only one in the game. The law can be conceived of as perfect all along:
Psalm 19.7: 7 The law of Yahweh is perfect, restoring the soul; the testimony of Yahweh is sure, making wise the simple.
As for the "law of freedom" being an oxymoron, it seems wise to read this phrase in light of the Jewish tendency, as a reaction to Greek philosophy, to describe the Law of Moses as the pinnacle of philosophical reasoning. The word ἐλευθερία may be rare in the New Testament, but it can appear quite often in certain Jewish contexts involving the law, including Philo's dissertation on freedom:
Philo, Every Good Man Is Free 7.41-50: 41 And every one may learn to appreciate the true freedom [ἐλευθερίαν] of which the virtuous man is in the enjoyment from other circumstances. No slave can ever true happiness enjoy. For what can be more miserable than to have no power over anything, not even over one's self? But then a man is happy, inasmuch as he bears within himself the foundation and complement of virtue and excellence, in which consists the supreme power over all things, [...] so that beyond all controversy and of necessity the virtuous man is free. 42 Besides all this, would not any one affirm that the friends of God are free? unless indeed one can think it consistent to attribute to the companions of kings, not only freedom but even at times a great degree of authority, when they commit magistracies to them, and when they, in consequence, fulfill the offices of subordinate rulers; and yet, at the same time, to speak of slavery in connection with the gods of heaven, when those men, on account of the love which they have shown to God, have also at once become beloved by God, being requited by him with good will equal to their own, truth being the judge, so that they as the poets say, are universal princes and kings of kings. 43 But the lawgiver of the Jews [ὁ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτης] ventures upon a more bold assertion even than this, inasmuch as he was, as it is reported, a student and practicer of plain philosophy; and so he teaches that the man who is wholly possessed with the love of God and who serves the living God alone, is no longer man, but actually God, being indeed the God of men, but not of the parts of nature, in order to leave to the Father of the universe the attributes of being both and God. 44 Is it right, then, to think a man who is invested with such privileges as these a slave, or rather as the only one who is free? Who, even though he may not be thought worthy by himself of being classed as God, one nevertheless ought by all means to pronounce happy, by reason of his having God for his friend; for God is not a weak champion, nor regardless of the rights and claims of friendship, inasmuch as he is the God of companionship, and as he presides over everything that belongs to companions. 45 Moreover, as among cities, some being governed by an oligarchy or by tyrants, endure slavery, having those who have subdued them and made themselves masters of them for severe and cruel tyrants; while others, existing under the superintending care of the laws and under those good protectors, are free and happy. So also in the case of men; those who are under the dominion of anger, or appetite, or any other passion, or of treacherous wickedness, are in every respect slaves; and those who live in accordance with the law are free [ὅσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμου ζῶσιν ἐλεύθεροι]. 46 But the unerring law is right reason; not an ordinance made by this or that mortal, a corruptible and perishable law, a lifeless law written on lifeless parchment or engraved on lifeless columns; but one imperishable, and stamped by immortal nature on the immortal mind. 47 On which account any one may reasonably marvel at the dimsightedness of those who do not see the particular characters of things which are so clear, and who say that for those mighty nations of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, the laws of Solon and Lycurgus are quite sufficient to ensure the liberty of the people if they only have the mastery and dominion, and if the people who live in those cities do dutifully obey them, and who yet affirm that right reason, which is the fountain from which all other laws do spring, is not sufficient for wise men to enable them to arrive at a participation in freedom, even though they obey it in all the particulars as to what it commands and what it prohibits. 48 Moreover, in addition to what has been already said, there is one most undeniable proof of freedom, equality of speech, which all virtuous men use to one another; on which account they say that the following iambics are inspired with the true spirit of genuine philosophy: "For slaves no freedom have, not even in speech." And again: "You're but a slave, and may not dare to speak." 49 As, therefore, musical science gives to all those who have studied music an equal right to speak on matters connected with their art; and as a man who is learned in grammar or in geometry has a right to speak among grammarians and mathematicians, so also the law in life allows the same privilege to those who are learned in the way in which men ought to live. 50 But all virtuous men are skillful in all the affairs which belong to life, inasmuch as they also are so with respect to the things which belong to universal nature; and some of them are free; and so therefore are they who have the freedom of speaking to them on equal terms; therefore no virtuous man is a slave, but all are free [ἐλεύθεροι].
"Those who live in accordance with the law are free," oxymoronic or not.
In 4 Maccabees the function of reason, far from merely enabling one to grasp the niceties of Greek philosophy, is what empowers one to obey the law, even to the point of death:
4 Maccabees 1.15-17: 15 Now reason [λογισμός] is the mind that with sound logic prefers the life of wisdom [σοφίας]. 16 Wisdom, next, is the knowledge of divine and human matters and the causes of these. 17 This, in turn, is education in the law [νόμου], by which we learn divine matters reverently and human affairs to our advantage.
4 Maccabees 1.34: 34 Therefore when we crave seafood and fowl and animals and all sorts of foods that are forbidden to us by the law [νόμον], we abstain because of domination by reason [λογισμοῦ].
4 Maccabees 14.8: 8 For they constituted a holy chorus of religion and encouraged one another, saying, 9 "Brothers, let us die like brothers for the sake of the law; let us imitate the three youths in Assyria who despised the same ordeal of the furnace. 10 Let us not be cowardly in the demonstration of our piety."
James 2.8 mentions the royal law, and 4 Maccabees asserts that those who obey the law are royalty:
4 Maccabees 2.23: 23 To the mind he gave the law [νόμον]; and one who lives subject to this will rule a kingdom [βασιλείαν] that is temperate, just, good, and courageous.
In fact, 4 Maccabees also associates reason, the enabler of lawful behavior, both with royalty and with freedom, reminding one of the "law of freedom" in James 1.25; 2.12:
4 Maccabees 14.2: 2 O reason, more royal than kings and freer than the free [ὦ βασιλέων λογισμοὶ βασιλικώτεροι καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἐλευθερώτεροι]!
Thus it seems perfectly possible to me to think of the Law of Moses itself as a law of freedom. How does it seem to you?